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Abstract.	  The	   thesis	   that	   the	  material	  origins	  of	   artefacts	  are	  essential	   to	  them	   is	   highly	   intuitive,	   but	   in	   a	   flexible	   version.	   It	   is	   not	   exact	  match	   of	  material	  origins	   that	   is	   intuitively	  essential,	  but	  approximate	  match.	  After	  an	  in-­‐depth	  exploration	  of	  the	  theoretical	  options	  open	  to	  accommodate	  the	  flexible	  version,	  the	  paper	  ends	  up	  favouring	  the	  inflexible	  one.	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1.	  Introduction	  The	   thesis	   of	   essentiality	   of	   origins—roughly,	   that	   origins	   are	   essential	   to	   originated	  entities—has	  been	  wildly	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature.	  Although	  not	  universally	  accepted,1	  it	   is	  the	  majority’s	  view	  that	  some	  qualified	  and	  perhaps	  restricted	  version	  of	  it	   is	  true.	  There	   is	  no	  consensus,	  however,	  as	   to	  which	   is	   the	  strongest,	   true	  version.2	  Part	  of	   the	  controversy	   turns	   on	   what	   should	   be	   considered	   as	   partly	   constitutive	   of	   an	   entity’s	  origin.	  When	  restricted	  to	  artefacts,	  for	  instance,	  the	  material	  aspect	  seems	  relevant,	  as	  well	  as	  authorship,	  but	  not	  so	  much	  the	  location	  aspect.	  We	  can	  capture	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  material	  aspect	  by	  means	  of	  a	  qualified	  version	  of	  essentiality	  of	  origins,	  restricted	  to	  artefacts,	   which	   I	   shall	   call	   ‘Essentiality	   of	  Material	   Origins	   for	   Artefacts’;	   (EMOA)	   for	  short.	   (EMOA)	   holds	   that	   material	   origins	   are	   essential	   to	   artefacts.	   Not	   even	   this	  qualified	  and	  restricted	  version,	  however,	  is	  free	  of	  controversy.	  Intuition	  seems	  to	  call	  for	  further	  relaxation.	  Let	  a	  be	  a	  table	  actually	  originated	  from	  matter	  m0.	  Intuitively,	  if,	  at	   the	   moment	   of	   creation,	   a	   single	   molecule	   of	   m0	   had	   been	   absent	   or	   replaced	   by	  another,	   a	  would	   still	   have	   come	   into	   existence.	   Accordingly,	   it	   is	   not	   exact	   match	   of	  material	   origins	   that	   is	   intuitively	   relevant	   to	   the	   identity	   of	   table	   a	   but,	   rather,	  approximate	  match.	  We	  can	  thus	  distinguish	  between	  an	  inflexible	  and	  a	  flexible	  version	  of	  (EMOA).	  Consider	  the	  inflexible	  property	  F0	  and	  the	  flexible	  F0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  F0:	  	   being	  originally	  constructed	  from	  (exactly)	  m0	  
F0:	  	  being	  originally	  constructed	  from	  a	  hunk	  of	  matter	  that	  highly	  overlaps	  with	  m0 Whereas	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	  holds	  that	  F0	  is	  essential	  to	  a,	  flexible-­‐(EMOA)	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  
F0.	  According	  to	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA),	  there	  is	  only	  one	  piece	  of	  matter	  table	  a	  can	  be	  made	  from:	  m0.	  By	  contrast,	  according	  to	  flexible-­‐(EMOA),	  there	  are	  several	  hunks	  a	  could	  be	  made	  from.	  For	  simplicity,	  I	  shall	  assume	  all	  along	  the	  paper	  that,	  according	  to	  flexible-­‐(EMOA),	  there	  are	  always	  (exactly)	  5	  pieces	  of	  matter	  a	  very	  same	  table	  could	  be	  made	  from.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a,	  let	  these	  hunks	  be:	  m-­‐2,	  m-­‐1,	  m0,	  m1	  and	  m2.3	  With	  this	  assumption,	  
F0	  can	  be	  extensionally	  analysed	  as	  the	  property	  of	  being	  originally	  constructed	  from	  m-­‐2,	  
m-­‐1,	   m0,	   m1	  or	   m2.	   (I	   shall	   treat	   this	   property	   and	   F0	   as	   the	   same	   property;	   nothing	  essential	  depends	  on	  it.)	  	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   flexible-­‐(EMOA)	   is	   intuitively	   more	   plausible:	   the	   very	   same	  
table	  could	  intuitively	  have	  originated	  from	  slightly	  different	  pieces	  of	  matter.	  This	  much	  is	   widely	   accepted.	   The	   reason	   why	   flexible-­‐(EMOA)	   is	   nonetheless	   a	   controversial	  thesis	   is	   that	   endorsing	   it	   has	   been	   proved	   to	   have	   costs	   somewhere	   else	   in	   one’s	  philosophical	  system.	  Salmon	  (1982),	  for	  instance,	  thinks	  that	  endorsing	  it—as	  he	  thinks	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Strong	  haecceitists,	  like	  P.	  Mackie	  (2006),	  for	  instance,	  would	  reject	  it.	  	  2	  See	  footnote	  7	  for	  some	  sample	  literature.	  	  3	  The	  property	  F0	  implies	  the	  flexible	  one	  F0:	  whatever	  comes	  from	  m0	  comes	  from	  either	  m-­‐2,	  m-­‐1,	  m0,	  m1	  or	  m2.	  Yet,	   the	  essentialist	  claim	   ‘F0	   is	  essential	   to	  a’	  does	  not	   imply	  the	  claim	   ‘F0	   is	  essential	  to	  a’.	  The	  former	  implies	  that	  a	  must	  originate	  from	  m0,	  whereas	  the	  latter	  implies	  that	  a	  can	  originate	  from	  any	  of	  m-­‐2,	  m-­‐1,	  m0,	  m1	  or	  m2	  (and	  must	  originate	  from	  one	  of	  those).	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one	   should	   do—forces	   us	   to	   reject	   that	   the	   accessibility	   relation	   among	   worlds	   is	  transitive.	   This	   is	   a	   cost	   for	   everyone.	   Simplicity	   and	   elegance	   (if	   not	   (also)	   intuitive)	  considerations	  favour	  the	  transitivity	  of	  that	  relation	  over	  its	  non-­‐transitivity.	  It	  is	  a	  cost	  that,	  while	  Salmon	  is	  ready	  to	  pay,	  Williamson	  (1990)	  is	  not.	  As	  a	  reaction,	  and	  against	  Salmon,	  Williamson	  shows	  that	  one	  can	  have	  both	  desiderata:	  one	  can	  accommodate	  the	  transitivity	   of	   the	   accessibility	   relation	   among	   worlds	   within	   a	   flexible-­‐(EMOA)	  framework.	  Unfortunately,	  however,	  Williamson’s	  solution	  is	  not	  as	  stable	  as	  one	  would	  think	   on	   this	   basis,	   for	   it	   has	   other	   costs;	   costs	   that	   Salmons’	   account	   does	   not	   have.	  Namely,	  Williamson’s	  solution	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  thesis	  that	  there	  are	  no	  coincident	  artefacts	  of	  the	  same	  kind,	   fully	  sharing	  their	  spatio-­‐temporal	  region,	  thereby	  allowing,	  contra	  intuition,	  the	  existence	  of	  several	  fully	  spatio-­‐temporally	  coincident	  tables.	  	  	  	   One	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  scrutinize	  Salmon’s	  and	  Williamson’s	  views	  to	  see	  whether	  we	  can	  find	  reasons	  to	  prefer	  one	  to	  the	  other.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  this	  introduction	  has	  made	   explicit	   so	   far,	  we	   seem	   to	   be	   facing	   a	   reflective	   equilibrium	   problem	   involving	  three	  main	  theses:	  	  (1)	   Flexible-­‐(EMOA)	  (2)	   The	  accessibility	  relation	  among	  worlds	  is	  transitive	  	  (3)	   There	  are	  no	  coincident	  artefacts	  of	  the	  same	  kind,	  fully	  sharing	  their	  spatio-­‐temporal	  region	  	  There	   also	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   tie	   between	   the	   two	   views:	   each	  manages	   to	   accommodate	  exactly	   two	  of	   the	   three	  desiderata	   theses.	  To	  be	   able	   to	  break	   the	   (apparent)	   tie,	   the	  scrutinizing	   of	   the	   views	   should	   reveal	   additional	   hidden	   costs	   in	   at	   least	   one	   of	   the	  views.	  As	  it	  will	  turn	  out,	  there	  are	  two	  further	  desiderata-­‐theses	  that	  only	  Williamson’s	  view	  manages	  to	  accommodate.	  This	  will	  be	  offered	  as	  reasons	  to	  prefer	  it	  to	  Salmon’s:	  (4)	   There	  are	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  artefacts	  (5)	   If	  P	  is	  the	  individual	  essence	  of	  an	  artefact,	  then	  all	  properties	  analogous	  to	  P	  are	  individual	  essences	  of	  artefacts	  too	  All	   five	   theses	   will	   end	   up	   being	   involved	   in	   the	   reflective	   equilibrium	   exercise	   this	  paper	   constitutes.	   The	   game	   is	   to	   find	   the	  most	   conservative	   view.	   It	   is	   a	   sub-­‐optimal	  game	   right	   from	   the	   start	   because,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   (1)-­‐(5)	   are	   jointly	   incompatible4	  and,	   on	   the	   other,	   each	   is,	   individually,	   a	   desiderata:	   flexible-­‐(EMOA)	   is	   (intuitively)	  preferable	   to	   both	   its	   inflexible	   version	   and	   the	   denial	   of	   the	   essentiality	   of	   origins	  altogether,	  and	  each	  of	  (2)-­‐(5)	  is	  preferable—either	  theoretically,	  intuitively,	  or	  both—to	  its	  negation.	  So	  there	  will	  be	  a	  cost	  somewhere;	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  minimize	  it.	  	   An	  initial	  diagnosis,	  as	  anticipated,	   is	  that	  Williamson’s	  view	  is	  superior	  to	  Salmon’s	  in	   that	  while	  Williamson’s	   accommodates	  all	   theses	  except	   (3)—this	   is	   shown	   in	  §3—Salmon’s	   accommodates	   only	   (1)	   and	   (3);	   as	   shown	   in	   §2.	   Despite	   this	   superiority,	  denying	   (3)	  might	   be	   unacceptable	   in	   itself.	   At	   this	   point,	   and	   as	   a	   second	   aim	   of	   the	  paper,	   the	  exploration	  of	  a	  view	  that	  denies	  only	  (1)—and	  endorses	   instead	   inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	  as	  the	  most	  conservative	  way	  of	  denying	  (1)—emerges	  as	  an	  urgent	  task;	  one	  that	  I	  take	  up	  in	  §4.	  This	  exploration	  has	  been	  neglected	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  intuitiveness	  of	  flexible-­‐(EMOA)—and	  the	  unintuitiveness	  of	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA).	  It	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 	  It	   is	   not	   convenient	   to	   unfold	   the	   incompatibility	   without	   appropriate	   stock,	   but	   the	  incompatibility	  will	  emerge	  clear	  as	  we	  go	  along	  and	  it	  is	  shown	  in	  footnote	  18.	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not	  to	  be	  taken	  for	  granted,	  however,	  that	  a	  view	  that	  denies	  (1)	  will	  always	  be,	  all	  things	  
considered,	  a	  loser;	  I	  shall	  motivate	  that	  it	  is	  not.	  	  	  
2.	  Scrutinizing	  Salmon’s	  view	  On	  the	  basis	  of	   flexible-­‐(EMOA)—our	  thesis	  (1)—Salmon	  (1982)	  constructs	  a	  paradox,	  the	   Four	   worlds	   paradox,	   and	   suggests	   as	   a	   (forced	   upon)	   solution	   to	   it	   the	   non-­‐transitivity	   of	   the	   accessibility	   relation	   among	   worlds—that	   is,	   the	   denial	   of	   (2).	   The	  paradox	  is	  initially	  presented	  as	  a	  conflict	  between	  (1)	  and	  (4)	  but,	  according	  to	  Salmon,	  his	  solution	  allows	  him	  to	  diagnose	  that	  conflict	  as	  merely	  apparent	  and	  to	  keep	  both	  of	  them.	  Before	  presenting	  the	  paradox,	  we	  should	  see	  what	  thesis	  (4)	  amounts	  to	  and	  how	  it	  interacts	  with	  (1).	  	  	  
Preliminaries.	  Essential	  properties	  typically	  impose	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  entities	  to	  exist:	   if	   property	   F0	   is	   essential	   to	   a,	   table	   a	   cannot	   exist	   unless	   it	   originates	   from	  (exactly)	  m0.	  If	   it	   is	   instead	  the	  flexible	  F0	  that	   is	  essential	  to	  a,	  a	  cannot	  exist	  unless	   it	  originates	   from	   some	   of	   m-­‐2,	   m-­‐1,	   m0,	   m1	   or	   m2.	   The	   literature	   has	   also	   flirted	   with	  
sufficiency	   properties:	   properties	   that	   provide	   instead	   sufficient	   conditions	   for	   the	  existence	  of	  entities.	  	  	   Take	   table	   a	  again.	   Apart	   from	   the	  material	   aspect	   of	   its	   origin,	   m0,	   let’s	   take	   into	  account	   also	   the	   artisan	  who	  made	   it,	  A,	   the	  manufacturing	   plan,	  P,	   and	   the	   time	   and	  place	   of	   the	  manufacturing	   process,	   t	  and	  p.	   Salmon	   believes	   that	   instantiation	   of	   the	  following	  complex	  property	  is	  sufficient	  for	  table	  a	  (and	  no	  other)	  to	  pop	  into	  existence:	  S0	  =	  being	  originally	  made	  from	  m0,	  by	  A,	  according	  to	  P,	  and	  at	  t	  and	  p.	  Salmon	   is	   therefore	   committed	   to	   (4)	   by	   means	   of	   endorsing	   properties	   like	   S0	   as	  sufficiency	   properties;	   equivalently,	   by	   means	   of	   endorsing	   trans-­‐world	   identification	  
principles	  like	  (V’’):5	  	  (V’’)	   If	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   a	   table	   x	   to	   be	   the	   only	   table	   [in	   a	   world]	   originally	  constructed	   (by	   a	   certain	   artisan	   in	   a	   certain	   place	   at	   a	   certain	   time)	   from	   a	  certain	  hunk	  of	  matter	  y	  according	  to	  plan	  P,	  then	  necessarily,	  any	  table	  that	  is	  the	   only	   table	   [in	   a	   world]	   to	   be	   originally	   constructed	   (by	   the	   very	   same	  artisan	  in	  the	  very	  same	  place	  at	  the	  very	  same	  time)	  from	  the	  very	  same	  hunk	  of	  matter	  y	  according	  to	  the	  very	  same	  plan	  P	   is	  the	  very	  same	  table	  x	  and	  no	  other.	  (Salmon	  1982,	  229)6	  The	  intuition	  behind	  sufficiency	  principles	  like	  (V’’)	  is	  known	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  an	  anti-­‐
haecceitist	   intuition,	   which	   would	   be	   contrary	   to	   haecceitistic	   switches	   among	   worlds;	  that	   is,	   contrary	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   atom-­‐per-­‐atom	   identical	   worlds	   that	   nonetheless	  differ	   in	   which	   individuals	   exist	   in	   them.	   These	   are	   the	   sort	   of	   questions	   one	   can	  motivate	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition	  with:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  I	  am	  keeping	  Salmon’s	  name.	  	  6	  Sufficiency	  properties	  provide	  trans-­‐world	  identification	  principles	  because	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  two	  worlds	  to	  agree	  on	  which	  sufficiency	  properties	  are	  instantiated	  and	  yet	  disagree	  on	  which	  entities	   instantiate	   them.	   They	   serve	   to	   identify	   the	   instantiator	   of,	   say,	   S0,	   in	   one	   world	   as	  (numerically)	  the	  same	  entity	  as	  that	  which	  instantiates	  S0	  in	  another	  world.	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If	  two	  tables	  in	  two	  different	  possible	  worlds	  are	  constructed	  from	  the	  very	  same	  stuff	  in	  precisely	  the	  same	  way	  and,	  let	  us	  assume,	  with	  exactly	  the	  same	  structure	  atom	  from	  atom,	  how	  can	  they	  fail	  to	  be	  the	  very	  same	  table?	  What	  more	  could	  one	  ask?	  What	  more	  is	  there	  to	  being	  this	  very	  table?	  (Salmon	  1982,	  p.	  211)	  The	  intuition	  underlying	  (4)	  is,	  thus,	  that	  being	  supervenes	  on	  qualitative	  character	  and	  identity	  of	  matter	  (if	  not	  on	  qualitative	  character	  alone).	  	   	  	  Salmon’s	  belief	  in	  sufficiency	  properties	  such	  as	  S0	  combined	  with	  his	  belief	  in	  flexible-­‐(EMOA)	  commits	  him,	  first,	  to	  S0	  not	  being	  essential	  to	  a	  and,	  second,	  to	  it	  not	  being	  the	  only	   property	   that	   is	   sufficient	   for	   a’s	   existence.	   It	   is	   not	   essential	   to	   a	   because,	  according	  to	  flexible-­‐(EMOA),	  a	  can	  equally	  come	  into	  existence	  from	  m-­‐2,	  m-­‐1,	  m1	  or	  m2.	  It	   is	   not	   the	   only	   sufficiency	   property	   for	   a	   because,	   given	   (V’’)	   and	   a’s	   five	   possible	  material	  origins,	  these	  other	  properties	  are	  also	  sufficient	  for	  a’s	  existence:	  S-­‐2	  =	  being	  originally	  made	  from	  m-­‐2,	  by	  A,	  according	  to	  P,	  and	  at	  t	  and	  p	  S-­‐1	  =	  being	  originally	  made	  from	  m-­‐1,	  by	  A,	  according	  to	  P,	  and	  at	  t	  and	  p	  S1	  =	  being	  originally	  made	  from	  m1,	  by	  A,	  according	  to	  P,	  and	  at	  t	  and	  p	  S2	  =	  being	  originally	  made	  from	  m2,	  by	  A,	  according	  to	  P,	  and	  at	  t	  and	  p	  So	   far,	   therefore,	   a	   has	   an	   essential	   property—the	   flexible	   F0—and	   five	   sufficiency	  properties—the	   inflexible	   S-­‐2,	   S-­‐1,	   S0,	   S1	   and	   S2.	   It	   also	   has	   an	   individual	   essence.	   An	  individual	  essence	  is	  a	  property,	  P,	  which	  is	  both	  essential	  to	  an	  entity	  and	  sufficient	  for	  its	   existence.	   Individual	   essences,	   therefore,	   provide	   both	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	  conditions	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   entities.	   None	   of	   the	   properties	   considered	   so	   far,	  however,	   are	   candidates	   to	   being	   individual	   essences	   of	  a.	   For	   none	   of	   the	   sufficiency	  properties	   above	   is	   in	   addition	   essential	   to	   a,	   and	   F0	   is	   arguably	   not	   in	   addition	   a	  sufficiency	  property	  of	  a;	   for	  m0	  could	  be	  used	  to	  make	  different	   types	  of	  entities,	  or	  a	  largely	  different	  table	  by	  someone	  else.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  Salmon	  is	  not—by	   endorsing	   both	   (1)	   and	   (4)—committed	   to	   individual	   essences	   as	   well.	   He	   is.	   The	  current	   considerations	   help	   us	   reveal	   that	   a’s	   individual	   essence	   is	   of	   a	   flexible	   sort,	  because	   it	   inherits	   F0’s	   flexibility.	   To	   illustrate	   this	   we’ve	   got	   to	   simplify	   or	   the	  discussion	  will	  soon	  become	  unmanageable.	  From	  now	  on,	  let	  us	  abbreviate	  with	  ‘C’	  the	  artisan,	  plan,	  time	  and	  place	  parameters	  above,	  and	  let	  us	  assume	  that	  S-­‐2,	  S-­‐1,	  S0,	  S1	  and	  S2	  are	   the	  only	  possible	  ways	   for	  a	  to	  come	   into	  existence.7	  With	  this	  abbreviation	  and	  simplification,	  the	  flexible	  S0	  is	  an	  individual	  essence	  of	  a:	  
S0	  =	  Originating	  from	  any	  of	  m-­‐2,	  m-­‐1,	  m0,	  m1	  and	  m2	  plus	  the	  C-­‐conditions.	  That	   S0	   is,	   despite	   flexible,	   an	   individual	   essence	   of	   a	   is	   grounded	   in	   that	   originating	  from	  some	  of	  m-­‐2	  to	  m2	  (plus	  C)	  is	  necessary	  for	  a’s	  existence	  while	  originating	  from	  any	  of	   them	  (plus	  C)	   is	  sufficient	   for	   it.	  These	  preliminaries	  put	  us	   in	  a	  position	  to	  see	  next	  the	  apparent	  conflict	  between	  (1)	  and	  (4)	  which	  generates	  the	  paradox.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 	  This	   assumes	   that	   all	   the	   C-­‐parameters	   are	   inflexibly	   essential	   to	   a.	   This	   is	   harmless	  idealization.	   There	   is	   a	   discussion	   on	  C-­‐constraints	   led	   by	  Robertson	   (1998	   and	  2000),	   Forbes	  (2002)	   and	   Hawthorne	   and	   Gendler	   (2000).	   I	   sympathize	   with	  most	   of	   Robertson’s	   ideas	   but	  nothing	  here	  requires	  me	  to	  engage	  in	  that	  (orthogonal)	  discussion:	  whatever	  the	  C-­‐constraints	  are,	  they	  belong	  to	  what	  I	  am	  here	  abbreviating	  with	  ‘C’	  and	  assuming	  to	  be	  inflexibly	  essential.	  	  	  
	   	   Sonia	  Roca-­‐Royes	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The	  Four	  Worlds	  Paradox.	  Assume	  flexible-­‐(EMOA)—thesis	  (1)—and	  assume	  also	  that	  the	  maximum	  difference	  a	  table	  can	  allow	  in	  its	  origins	  is	  2%	  of	  its	  original	  matter.	  Let	  w1	  be	  the	  actual	  world	  where	  a	  table,	  a,	  is	  originally	  constructed	  from	  m0	  (plus	  C).	  From	  w1,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  make	  some	  table	  from	  m3,	  3%	  different	  from	  m0.	  Let	  w2	  account	  for	  this	  possibility.	  By	  flexible-­‐(EMOA)	  plus	  the	  2%	  assumption,	  we	  get	  that	  a	  is	  numerically	  distinct	  from	  b.	  However,	  again	  by	  flexible-­‐(EMOA),	  both	  a	  and	  b	  could	  originate	  from	  m2	  (plus	  C),	  where	  m2	  is	  2%	  different	  from	  m0	  and	  1%	  different	  from	  m3.	  This	  gives	  us	  two	  further	  worlds,	  w3	  and	  w4,	  accounting	  for	  these	  possibilities.	  Schematically:	  	   w1:	   a/m0/C	   ⇒	   w2:	  	  	  	  b/m3/C	   	   ¬(m0≈m3)	  
⇓	   	   	   	   ⇓	  w3:	   a/m2/C	   	   w4:	   b/m2/C	   	   (m0≈m2)	  	  	  	  and	  	  	  	  (m2≈m3)	  
figure	  1	  Notation:	   ┌x≈y┐	   abbreviates	   that	   hunks	   x	   and	   y	   are	   quasi-­‐identical	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  overlapping	  in	  at	  least	  98%.	  The	  arrows	  refer	  to	  the	  accessibility	  relation	  among	  worlds.	  	   This	   scenario	   would	   show	   a	   tension	   between	   (1)	   and	   (4)	   because,	   while	   being	  constructed	  under	  the	  assumption	  of	  (1),	  worlds	  w3	  and	  w4	  appear	  to	  falsify	  (4).	  In	  the	  first	   instance,	   they	   appear	   to	   falsify	   (V’’),	   endorsement	   of	   which	   is	   Salmon’s	   way	   of	  endorsing	  (4).	  The	  reason	  is	  as	  follows:	  originating	  from	  m2+C	  is	  possible	  for	  both	  a	  and	  
b,	  but	  the	  scenario	  reveals	  this	  property	  (namely,	  S2)	  to	  be	  sufficient	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  none,	  as	  b	  does	  not	  exist	   in	  w3	  and	  a	  does	  not	  exist	   in	  w4.	  Contrary	   to	   (V’’),	   therefore,	  properties	   like	   S2	   would	   not	   be	   sufficiency	   properties.	   Further	   reflection	   reveals	   also	  that	   there	   is	  no	  way	  of	   finding	  alternative	  properties	  with	  which	   to	   attempt	   to	   rescue	  (4).	  For	  nothing	  prevents	  w3	  and	  w4	  from	  being	  qualitatively	  indistinguishable,	  and	  even	  indistinguishable	   with	   respect	   to	   “the	   very	   matter	   they	   contain	   […],	   differing	   only	  gratuitously	   over	   the	   fact	   of	   which	   [ship/table]	   is	   constituted	   by	   a	   certain	   hunk	   of	  matter”	  (Salmon	  1982,	  232).	  Consequently,	  packing	  into	  the	  C-­‐constraints	  additional,	  or	  different,	  parameters	  will	  not	  help	  us	  eventually	  get	  a	  sufficiency	  property.	  The	  scenario	  appears	  to	  commit	  us	  to	  a	  pair	  of	  possible	  worlds	  which	  instantiate	  a	  mere	  haecceitistic	  
switch,	   the	   existence	   of	   which	   Salmon	   finds	   paradoxical	   precisely	   because	   of	   the	  intuitiveness	   of	   (4).	   (It	   in	   fact	   commits	   us	   to	   something	   stronger	   than	   a	   haecceitistic	  switch:	   not	   only	   do	   the	   beings	   of	   a	  and	   b	  not	   supervene	   on	   qualitative	   character—in	  itself	   sufficient	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   haecceitistic	   switches—but	   also	   they	   do	   not	  supervene	  on	  qualitative	  character	  plus	  identity	  of	  matter.)	  	  
Salmon’s	  Solution.	  Salmon	  believes,	  however,	  that	  the	  tension	  between	  (1)	  and	  (4)	  is	  only	   apparent	   and	   that	   it	   can	   be	   resolved	   by	   denying	   instead	   that	   the	   accessibility	  relation	  among	  worlds	  is	  transitive;	  that	  is,	  by	  denying	  our	  thesis	  (2).	  He	  motivates	  this	  by	  assuming	  that	  adding	  w5	  is	  a	  natural	  extension	  of	  the	  original	  scenario:	  	   w1:	   a/m0/C	   ⇒	  w2:	  	  	  	  b/m3/C	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ¬	  (m0≈m3)	  
⇓	   	   	   ⇓	  w3:	   a/m2/C	   	   w4:	  	  	  	  b/m2/C	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (m0≈m2)	  	  and	  	  (m2≈m3)	  
⇓	  w5:	  	  	  	  	   a/m3/C	  
figure	  2	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The	   actual	  world	   is	  w1.	   In	  w3,	  a	   is	   constructed	   from	  m2.	   From	   the	   fact	   that	  m2≈m3,	   it	  follows—or	   so	   assumes	   Salmon—that,	   from	   w3,	   a	   could	   originate	   from	   m3.	   This	  assumption	   guarantees	   the	   existence	   of	  w5.	   By	  ¬(m0≈m3),	  a	  cannot,	   from	   the	   point	   of	  view	  of	  the	  actual	  world	  w1,	  originate	  from	  m3.	  Consequently,	  w5	  is	  not	  possible	  relative	  to	  w1.	  This	  is	  a	  non-­‐paradoxical	  argument	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  transitivity—i.e.,	  for	  ¬(2).	  	  	   The	   denial	   of	   (2)	   would	   appear	   to	   solve	   the	   tension	   between	   (1)	   and	   (4).	   The	  paradoxical	  scenario	  was	  committed	   to	   the	   following	  accessibility	   facts	  among	  worlds:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  w1⇒w3	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  w1⇒w2	  and	  w2⇒w4.	  Since	  transitivity	  does	  not	   hold,	   the	   latter	   two	   facts	   do	   not	   commit	   us	   to	   w1⇒w4.	   Principle	   (V’’)	   would	   be	  falsified	  only	  if	  w1⇒w3	  and	  w1⇒w4,	  since	  only	  then	  would	  both	  w3	  and	  w4	  be	  accessible	  from	  w1,	   thereby	  being,	   from	  w1,	  both	  under	   the	  scope	  of	   the	  modal	  operators	   in	  (V’’).	  Let	  me	  elaborate.	  From	  w1,	  a	  can	  originate	  from	  m2,	  and	  it	  does	  so	  in	  possible	  world	  w3	  (which	   is	   accessible	   from	  w1).	   If,	   in	  w1,	  we	   apply	   (V’’)	   to	  a’s	   possibility	   of	   originating	  from	  m2,	  we	  get	  that	  in	  every	  possible	  world	  from	  w1—that	  is,	  in	  every	  world	  accessible	  from	  w1—in	  which	  some	  table	  originates	  from	  m2	  (plus	  C),	  that	  table	  is	  a.	  But	  isn’t	  w4	  a	  world	  that	  falsifies	  just	  this?	  Salmon	  answers	  this	  question	  in	  the	  negative,	  since	  we	  are	  now	  not	  committed	  to	  saying	  that	  w4	  is	  possible	  (i.e.,	  accessible)	  from	  w1.	  In	  other	  words,	  originating	  from	  m2	  is	  not,	  from	  w1,	  a	  possibility	  for	  b.	  Therefore,	  from	  w1,	  (V’’)	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  b	  would	  be	  the	  outcome	  of	  making	  m2	  into	  a	  table.	  Far	  from	  concluding	  that	  (V’’)—or	  (4)—is	  challenged	  by	  the	  paradoxical	  scenario,	  Salmon	  concludes	  instead	  that	  on	   the	   contrary,	   such	   principles	   might	   be	   taken	   as	   showing	   that	  w4	   cannot	   be	  possible	  relative	  to	  w1.	  (Salmon	  1982,	  p.	  240)	  This	  manoeuvre	  allows	  Salmon	  to	  save,	  at	  least,	  the	  letter	  of	  (V’’).	  	  	  
	  
Salmon’s	   Assumption.	   But,	   as	   anticipated,	   the	   solution	   assumes	   that	   w5	   is	   a	   natural	  addition	  and	  that	  it	  comes	  without	  hidden	  costs.	  I	  believe,	  however,	  that	  this	  assumption	  jeopardizes	   Salmon’s	   attempt	   to	   save	   (4).	   It	   amounts,	   as	   we	   shall	   see	   first,	   to	   the	  
contingency	   of	   (the	   essentiality	   of)	   essential	   properties	   and,	   consequently,	   to	   the	  contingency	  of	  sufficiency	  principles	  and	  individual	  essences.	  We	  shall	  see	  after	  this	  that	  this	  amounts	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  (4).	  	   According	   to	   Salmon’s	   non-­‐transitivity	   scenario,	   from	   w1	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   that	   a	  originates	  from	  m3,	  but	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  possibly	  possible:	  if	  a	  had	  been	  constructed	  from	  m2	  (as	  it	  does	  in	  possible	  world	  w3),	  it	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  for	  it	  to	  originate	  from	  m3.	   But	  why	   is	   this	   so?	   Assume	   that,	   in	  w1,	   a	  essentially	   has	   the	   flexible	   property	  F0.	  Consequently,	  a	  instantiates	  F0	   in	  all	  possible	  worlds	  where	  a	   exists,	   like	  w3	   (where	  a	  originates	  from	  m2).	  So,	  in	  w1,	  a	  has	  F0	  and	  it	  has	  it	  essentially.	  In	  w3,	  a	  has	  F0	  too.	  Does	  it	  have	  it	  essentially	  there	  too?	  Salmon	  assumes	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘no’.	  For,	  by	  assuming	  the	  existence	  of	  w5,	  he	  assumes	  that,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  w3,	  a	  can	  originate	  from	  m3,	  and	  this	  assumption	  is	  incompatible	  with	  a	  having	  F0	  essentially	  in	  w3—for	  m3	  is	  not	  quasi-­‐identical	   with	   m0.	   Salmon	   assumes	   that,	   in	   w3,	   where	   a	   comes	   from	   m2,	   a’s	  essential	  property	  is	  F2:	  
F2	   =	  	   being	  originally	  made	  from	  m0,	  m1,	  m2,	  m3,	  or	  m4	  In	  w3,	  therefore,	  a	  instantiates	  both	  F0	  and	  F2	  (among	  others).	  So	  far	  so	  good:	  they	  are	  disjunctive	  properties	  that	  share	  some	  of	  their	  disjuncts.	  And	  while	  the	  former	  was	  a’s	  essential	  property	  in	  w1,	  in	  w3	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  instead.	  So	  which	  properties	  are	  essential	  to	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to	   a	   is,	   across	   worlds,	   an	   inconstant	   matter	   for	   Salmon.	   Such	   contingency	   is	   not	  mandatory,	  though.	  In	  w1	  a	  has	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  origins:	  {m-­‐2,	  m-­‐1,	  m0,	  m1,	  m2}.	  In	  w3,	  a	  realizes	  one	  of	  them:	  m2.	  This	  realization	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  retaining	  the	  same	  range	  of	  possible	  origins	  in	  w3.	  Salmon,	  however,	  assumes	  that	  it	  has	  changed,	  the	  new	  range	  being	   {m0,	  m1,	  m2,	  m3,	  m4},	  where	   the	   realized	   possibility	   appears	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	  new	  range.	  In	  general	  terms,	  and	  more	  precisely,	  the	  assumption	  is	  this:	  	  
Salmon’s	   Assumption:	   For	   any	  world,	  w,	   and	   for	   any	   artefact	  a	   in	  w,	  a’s	   realized	  possibility	  in	  w	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a’s	  range	  of	  possibilities	  from	  w.8	  	  This	  assumption	  is,	  no	  doubt,	  related	  to	  the	  intuition	  behind	  flexible-­‐(EMOA)	  but	  it	  goes	  beyond	   it.	   Intuitively,	   an	   artefact’s	   essential	   properties	   are	   to	   some	   extent	   flexible	  regarding	   the	   material	   origins	   of	   that	   artefact,	   and	   this	   is	   neutral	   on	   whether	   these	  flexible	   essential	   properties	   are	   in	   turn	   necessarily	   essential	   to	   the	   artefact,	   or	   only	  
contingently	  essential.	  	  	   As	   a	   straightforward	   consequence	   of	   the	   contingency	   of	   (the	   essentiality	   of)	   these	  flexible	   essential	   properties,	   the	   range	   of	   sufficiency	   properties	   for	   an	   artefact	   also	  changes	  from	  world	  to	  world	  and,	  with	  it,	  its	  individual	  essence	  too.	  As	  illustrated	  above,	  the	  inflexible	  properties	  S-­‐2	  to	  S2	  are,	  from	  w1,	  sufficient	  for	  a’s	  existence,	  and	  the	  flexible	  
S0	  is	  its	  individual	  essence.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  has	  emerged	  here,	  it	  is	  immediate	  to	  see	  that,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  w3,	  the	  sufficiency	  properties	  are	  instead	  S0	  to	  S4,	  and	  its	  individual	   essence,	   S2.	  As	   we	   shall	   next	   unfold,	   this	   jeopardizes	   Salmon’s	   attempt	   to	  resolve	  the	  tension	  between	  (1)	  and	  (4).	  	  
	  
The	   failure	   of	   (4).	  The	   contingency	   of	   essences—more	   rigorously:	   the	   contingency	   of	  which	   properties	   are	   individual	   essences	   of	   which	   entities—trivially	   requires	   their	  relativization	  to	  worlds:	  as	  just	  seen,	  S0	  is	  the	  individual	  essence	  of	  a	  in	  w1,	  but	  not	  in	  w3	  (where	  S2	   is	   instead).	   But	   there	   is	   a	   further	   parameter	   to	  which	  we	   should	   relativize	  essences	   on	   Salmon’s	   ontological	   picture;	   namely,	   entities.	   This	   can	   be	   illustrated	   by	  playing	  to	  add	  worlds	  into	  figure	  1	  according	  to	  Salmon’s	  modal	  commitments.	  	  	   Salmon	  has	  already	  shown	  us	  two	  key	  moves	  of	  the	  game.	  First,	  w2	  was	  placed	  into	  the	  original	  scenario	  because,	  although	  from	  w1	  a	  cannot	  be	  made	  from	  m3,	  some	   table	  
can,	   and	  w2	   and	  possibile	  b	   play	   the	   role	   of	   accounting	   for	   that	   possibility.	   Second,	   as	  seen	  above	  and	  illustrated	  with	  figure	  2,	  he	  then	  added	  w5	  to	  the	  original	  scenario	  on	  the	  basis	  that,	  according	  to	  his	  rules	  (in	  particular,	  according	  to	  Salmon’s	  Assumption),	  a	  can,	  from	  w3,	  be	  made	  from	  m3,	  and	  w5	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  accounting	  for	  this	  possibility	  for	  a.	  These	   two	   moves	   can	   be	   iterated.	   The	   first	   one	   shows	   us	   how	   to	   expand	   figure	   1	  horizontally,	  and	  the	  second	  one,	  vertically.	  By	  iterating	  these	  moves,	  we	  end	  up	  with	  an	  (indefinitely	  expansible)	  ontological	  picture	  looking	  like	  this:	  	   	   	   	   …	  	   	   	   w0:	  	  	  	  b/m4/C	   	   …	  …	   	   	   ⇓	   	   ⇓	  
w1:	   a/m0/C	   ⇔ 	   w2:	  	  	  	  b/m3/C	   	   ⇔ 	   wh:	  	  	  	  c/m6/C	  	  	  	  	   ...	  	  
⇓	   	   	   ⇓	   	   ⇓	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  I	  antecedently	  identified	  this	  assumption	  in	  (Roca-­‐Royes,	  2006).	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w3:	   a/m2/C	   	   w4:	  	  	  	  b/m2/C	   	   wi:	  	  	  	  c/m5/C	   …	  
⇓	   	   	   ⇓	   	   ⇓	  w5:	  	  	  	  	  a/m3/C	   	   w6:	  	  	  	  b/m1/C	   	   wj:	  	  	  	  c/m4/C	   …	  
⇓	   	   	   ⇓	   	   ⇓	  w7:	  	  	   a/m4/C	   	   w8:	  	  	  	  b/m0/C	   	   wk:	  	  	  	  c/m3/C	   …	  …	   	   	   …	   	   …	   …	  
figure	  3	  Reflection	  on	  figure	  3	  reveals	  that,	  for	  each	  S-­‐type	  flexible	  property,	  Si,	  there	  are	  distinct	  worlds	  (w,	  w’)	  and	  distinct	  entities	  (e,	  e’)	  such	  that:	  	   (a)	   Si	  individuates	  e	  in	  w	  	   (b)	   Si	  individuates	  e’	  in	  w’	  The	  following	  are	  instances	  of	  that	  general	  claim:	  (a’)	  	   S3	  individuates	  a	  in	  w5	  (b’)	  	   S3	  individuates	  b	  in	  w2	  (a’’)	  	   S2	  individuates	  a	  in	  w3	  (b’’)	  	   S2	  individuates	  b	  in	  w4	  From	  this,	   the	  relativity	  of	  essences	  not	  only	   to	  worlds	  but	  also	   to	  entities	  follows:	  not	  only	   it	   is	   contingent	   which	   individual	   essence	   a	   has	   in	   which	   world,	   but	   also	   it	   is	  contingent	  which	  entity	  S3	  (for	  instance)	  is	  an	  individual	  essence	  of.9	  If	  we	  consider	  the	  total	  space	  of	  brute	  worlds,10	  S-­‐type	  properties	  are,	  at	  best,	  uniqueness	  properties.	  They	  are	  not,	  however,	  individuative	  properties	  in	  the	  absolute	  (brute)	  sense.	  This	  will	  emerge	  as	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  	   A	   preliminary	   excursus	   is	   convenient,	   first,	   to	   give	   credit	   to	   a	   related	   objection	   by	  Lewis	  and,	  second,	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  the	  objection	  to	  follow.	  Lewis	  (1986)	  objected	  that	  the	  world-­‐relativity	  of	  essences	  turns	  Salmon’s	  account	  into	  an	  anti-­‐essentialist	  one:	  if	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  an	  object,	  a,	  to	  have	  different	  essential	  properties	  from	  its	  actual	  ones,	  this	  shows	  that	  those	  properties	  are	  not	  essential-­‐to-­‐a.	  	  There	  is	  worse	  to	  come:	  couldn’t	  we	  trace	  a	  very	  long	  chain	  of	  very	  small	  revisions	  leading	  from	  you	  to	  a	  poached	  egg?	  (Lewis	  1986,	  p.	  244)	  This	   objection	   exploits	   only	   the	   world-­‐relativity	   of	   essences.	   Just	   one—sufficiently	  long—(vertical)	  chain	  of	  worlds	  from	  figure	  3	  is	  enough	  to	  ground	  this	  worry.11	  	  	   I	  will	  present	  a	  different	   (related)	  objection	   that	  exploits	   the	  world+entity-­‐relativity	  of	  essences;	  the	  kind	  of	  relativity	  needed	  to	  secure	  pairs	  of	  (brute)	  worlds—like	  w3	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This	   does	   not	   follow	   from	   the	  mere	   contingency	   of	   essences.	   The	   chain	   on	   the	   left	   already	  implies	   the	  contingency	  of	  essences	   (of	  a	  in	  particular)	  but	  not	  yet	   its	   relativization	   to	  entities.	  For	   the	   latter,	  we	  need	  a	   further	   chain,	   like	   the	  middle	  one.	   Salmon	   is	   committed	   to	   this	   chain	  from	  the	  moment	  he	  wants	  to	  account	  for	  this	  possibility:	  “it	  is	  possible	  (from	  w1)	  to	  make	  some	  table	  from	  m3”.	  	  10	  The	  notion	  of	  brute	  world	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  thus:	  w	  is	  a	  brute	  world	  iff	  for	  some	  n≥0,	  either	  w	  is	  a	  possiblyn	  possible	  world	  or	  the	  actual	  world	  is	  a	  possiblyn	  possible	  world	  from	  w.	  11	  Salmon	   (1989)	   addresses	   this	   objection	   by	   stressing	   the	   difference	   between	   “ways	   things	  might	   be”	   (implying	   possibility)	   and	   “ways	   for	   things	   to	   be”	   (implying	   neither	   possibility	   nor	  possibilityn	   possibility,	   although	   compatible	   with	   both).	   I	   will	   not	   enter	   the	   details	   of	   that	  discussion	  here,	  but	  one	  can	  find	  them	  in	  Salmon	  (1982	  and	  1989)	  and	  Lewis	  (1986).	  
	   	   Sonia	  Roca-­‐Royes	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w4—instantiating	  what	  looks	  like	  a	  haecceitistic	  switch.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Salmon	  learns	  to	   live	  with	  w3	  and	  w4	  by	  denying	  that	   they	  are	  both	  possible:	  w3	   is	  possible,	  but	  w4	   is	  only	  possibly	  possible.	  Lewis	  (1986)	  complains	  about	  this	  too:	  	  It	   is	   not	   so,	   if	   we	   ignore	   worlds	   inaccessible	   from	   ours,	   that	   we	   have	   a	   case	   of	  haecceitistic	  difference.	  […]	  In	  these	  questions	  of	  haecceitism	  and	  essence,	  by	  what	  right	  do	  we	  ignore	  worlds	  that	  are	  deemed	  inaccessible?	  (Lewis	  1986,	  p.	  246)	  I	  shall	  turn	  this	  second	  complaint	  into	  an	  objection	  by	  showing	  that	  Salmon’s	  distinction	  between	   the	   possible	   and	   the	   possibly	   possible	   does	   not	   help.	   It	   can	   be	   sloganized	   by	  paraphrasing	  Lewis’s	  first	  objection:	  if	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  b	  to	  have	  a’s	  essential	  properties,	  this	  shows	  that	  those	  properties	  are	  not	  essential-­‐to-­‐a.	  	  Let	  us	  unfold	  it.	  	   I	   agreed	   above	   that	   Salmon’s	   solution	   validates	   the	   letter	   of	   (V’’).	   I	  will	   now	   argue	  that	  it	  violates	  its	  spirit,	  for	  it	  violates	  its	  underlying	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition	  that	  being	  supervenes	  on	  qualitative	  character	  plus	  identity	  of	  matter	  (and	  of	  C-­‐constraints).12	  This	  is	   the	  diagnosis	  of	  where	  things	  have	  gone	  wrong:	  Salmon	  (1982)	  starts	  with	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	   intuition	  that	   implies	  the	  existence	  of	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  artefacts.	  The	  correctness	  of	   this	   intuition	  should	  preclude	   the	  existence	  of	  haecceitistically	  different	  worlds.	  Some	  pages	  before	  announcing	  his	  ¬(2)	  solution,	  Salmon	  encodes	  this	  intuition,	  in	  (V’’),	  in	  a	  way	  that	  will	  be	  accepted	  by	  those	  whose	  modal	  thinking	  validates	  (2)—that	  is,	  whose	  modal	   thinking	   validates	   the	   characteristic	   axiom	  of	  modal	   logic	   S4.	   Salmon	  ends	   up,	   however,	   with	   a	   non-­‐S4	   logic.	   In	   his	   system,	   (V’’)	   becomes	   weaker	   than	   its	  underlying	  intuition	  because,	  since	  we	  cannot	  assume	  transitivity,	  the	  modal	  operators	  in	  (V’’)	  range	  over	  many	  fewer	  worlds	  than	  those	  for	  which	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition	  holds.	  This	  difference	  in	  strength	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  his	  account	  allows	  for	  worlds,	  such	  as	  w3	  and	  w4,	  that,	  while	  not	  falsifying	  (V’’),	  still	  generate	  the	  same	  puzzlement	  and	  raise	  the	  same	  questions	  by	  means	  of	  which	  Salmon	  motivated	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition:	  why	   is	  a	   in	  world	  w3	   not	  numerically	   identical	   to	  b	   in	  w4,	   given	   that	   those	  worlds	   are	  atom-­‐per-­‐atom	   identical?	   As	   these	   remarks	   reveal,	   when	   the	   letter	   of	   (V’’)	   and	   its	  underlying	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition	  come	  apart,	  it	  is	  no	  merit	  to	  show	  that	  the	  account	  validates	  the	  former;	  one	  should	  show	  that	  the	  account	  validates	  the	  intuition,	  or	  else	  a	  principle	  that,	  under	  the	  assumption	  of	  ¬S4,	  appropriately	  encodes	  it.13	  	   On	   the	  basis	  of	   this	  diagnosis,	   there	  are	   two	  reactions	   that	  come	   in	   the	   form	  of	   fair	  complaints	  against	  Salmon’s	  views.	  First,	  one	  can	  ask	  that	  (V’’)	  be	  strengthened	  so	  as	  to	  match,	  in	  a	  ¬S4-­‐framework,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  encode.	  The	  following	  is	  a	  good	  way	  of	  accordingly	  revising	  (V’’):	  (V’’’)	   If	   it	   is	  possiblyn	  possible	   (n≥0)	   for	   a	   table	  x	   to	  be	   the	  only	   table	   [in	   a	  world]	  originally	  constructed	  (by	  a	  certain	  artisan	  in	  a	  certain	  place	  at	  a	  certain	  time)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Strictly	  speaking,	  this	  is	  weaker	  than	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition	  (according	  to	  which	  being	  supervenes	   on	   qualitative	   matter).	   This	   partially	   explains	   why	   Salmon	   is	   so	   reluctant	   to	   deny	  (V’’),	  since	  denying	  it	  would	  result	  in	  something	  stronger	  than	  haecceitism:	  not	  only	  being	  would	  not	  supervene	  on	  qualitative	  character	  but	  also	  it	  would	  not	  supervene	  on	  qualitative	  character	  
plus	  identity	  of	  matter	  and	  other	  C-­‐constraints.	  I	  have	  been	  speaking	  loosely	  of	  the	  (V’’)-­‐intuition	  as	  an	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  one.	  	  	  	  	  13	  Note	   that,	  when	  working	  with	  modal	   logic	  S4—thereby	  endorsing	  our	   thesis	   (2)—principle	  (V’’)	   exactly	   encodes	   the	   anti-­‐haecceitist	   intuition	   because,	   when	   transitivity	   holds,	   we	   cannot	  interestingly	  play	  with	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  modal	  operators	  occurring	  in	  (V’’)	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Salmon	  played	  with	  it	  to	  try	  to	  solve	  the	  tension	  between	  (1)	  and	  (4).	  	  
Rethinking	  Origin	  Essentialism	   	   	  	  
 
11 
from	   a	   certain	   hunk	   of	   matter	   y	   according	   to	   plan	   P,	   then	   necessarilyn	  necessary	   (n≥0),	   any	   table	   that	   is	   the	  only	   table	   [in	   a	  world]	   to	  be	  originally	  constructed	  (by	  the	  very	  same	  artisan	  in	  the	  very	  same	  place	  at	  the	  very	  same	  time)	  from	  the	  very	  same	  hunk	  of	  matter	  y	  according	  to	  the	  very	  same	  plan	  P	  is	  the	  very	  same	  table	  x	  and	  no	  other.14	  But	  Salmon’s	  account	  does	  not	  validate	  (V’’’):	  both	  w3	  and	  w4	  are	  under	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  modal	   operators,	   and	   they	   falsify	   it.	   Consequently,	   Salmon	  hasn’t	  managed	   to	  dissolve	  the	  tension	  between	  (1)	  and	  (4).	  In	  particular,	  Salmon’s	  solution	  does	  not	  accommodate	  (4)—the	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  artefacts.	  	   The	   second	   reaction—leaving	   for	   now	   aside	   the	   conclusion	   just	   reached—is	   to	   ask	  for	   an	  answer	   to	   Salmon’s	   very	  own	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  motivating	  question:	   “What	  more	  [beyond	  qualitative	  character	  and	  identity	  of	  matter	  and	  C-­‐constraints]	  is	  there	  to	  being	  
this	  very	  table	  [a]?”	   (Salmon	  1982,	  211).	   If	   that	   could	  be	  satisfactorily	  answered,	   there	  could	  still	  be	  room	  to	  accommodate	  (4).	  I	  shall	  argue,	  however,	  that	  Salmon’s	  ontological	  picture	  cannot	  engender	  a	  satisfactory	  answer.	  The	  argument	  will	  have	   two	  key	  steps:	  (i)	  that	  any	  potentially	  satisfactory	  answer	  will	  need	  to	  appeal	  to	  accessibility	  facts;	  and	  (ii)	   that	   no	   answer	   that	   appeals	   to	   accessibility	   facts	   will	   (in	   Salmon’s	   ontological	  picture)	   be	   satisfactory.	   Let	   me	   start	   with	   (i).	   Considered	   as	   brute	   worlds,	   the	   only	  difference	   between	   w3	   and	   w4	   is	   the	   phenomenon	   to	   be	   explained;	   namely,	   the	  haecceitistic	  switch	  between	  a	  and	  b.	  There	  is	  no	  way	  of	  explaining	  this	  difference	  if	  we	  just	   focus	   on	   those	  worlds’	   intrinsic	   features.	   This	  was	   exactly	   the	   source	   of	  The	  Four	  
Worlds	   Paradox.	   Yet,	   when	   transitivity	   does	   not	   hold,	   there	   are	   also	   relational	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  worlds	  like,	  for	  instance,	  the	  fact	  that	  w3	  is	  accessed	  from	  w1	  (where	  a	  exists)	  but	  not	  from	  w2	  (where	  b	  instead	  exists);	  whereas	  it	  is	  the	  other	  way	  around	  in	  the	  case	  of	  w4.	  These	  relational	  facts	  will	  need	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  any	  potential	  answer	   because	   they	   are	   the	   only	   ones	   that	   make	   a	   difference	   with	   the	   paradoxical	  scenario.	   As	   anticipated	   in	   (ii),	   however,	   appeal	   to	   these	   relational	   (i.e.,	   accessibility)	  facts	  cannot	  engender	  a	  satisfactory	  explanation.	  Let	  us	  see	  why.	  What	  the	  existence	  of	  w3	   and	   w4	   shows	   is	   that	   instantiation	   of	   the	   (inflexible)	   property	   S2—namely,	   being	  
originally	   made	   from	  m2,	   by	   A,	   according	   to	   P,	   and	   at	   t	   and	   p—is	   a	   (brute)	   sufficient	  condition	   neither	   for	   a’s	   existence	   nor	   for	   b’s.	   Therefore,	   the	   mere	   fact	   that	   it	   is	  
instantiated	   cannot	   explain	  why	   it	   is	   a	   (and	   not	   b)	   that	   exists	   in	   w3.	   In	   other	   words,	  instantiation	  of	   this	   fact	   is	   insufficient	   for	   the	  being	  of	  a	  to	   supervene	  upon	   it;	   for	   that	  fact	   exists	   also	   in	   w4,	   where	   a	   does	   not	   exist.	   As	   suggested,	   to	   obtain	   an	   absolute	  sufficient	   condition,	   Salmon	   should	   constrain	   further	   that	   property	   by	   means	   of	  accessibility	   facts,	   thereby	   obtaining	   something	   along	   the	   following	   lines:	   being	  made	  
from	  m2	  (plus	  C)	  in	  a	  world	  accessed	  by	  another	  world	  in	  which	  a	  [b	  in	  the	  other	  case]	  has	  
been	  constructed	  by	  a	  hunk	  of	  matter	  overlapping	  to	  a	  high	  degree	  with	  m1.	  This,	  however,	  would	   only	   open	   an	   explanatory	   regress,	   since	   we	   would	   now	   need	   to	   explain	   what	  makes	   it	   the	   case	   that	   the	   world	   mentioned	   in	   this	   further	   constraint	   is	   an	   a-­‐world	  rather	   than	   a	   b-­‐world.	   If	   we	   look	   again	   at	   figure	   3	   above,	   the	   ultimate	   explanation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  This	  principle	   is	  weaker	   than	   it	   should,	   since	   the	  worlds	   captured	  by	   it	   belong	   to	   a	  proper	  sub-­‐model	  of	  the	  total	  modal	  space;	  namely:	  the	  generated	  sub-­‐model	  that	  has	  the	  actual	  world	  as	  its	  bottom	  element.	  Strictly,	  the	  principle	  should	  capture	  also	  the	  worlds	  for	  which	  the	  actual	  world	   is	   a	   possiblyn	   possible	   world	   (n≥0).	   For	   current	   purposes,	   however,	   the	   formulation	   in	  (V’’’)	  suffices.	  	  
	   	   Sonia	  Roca-­‐Royes	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Salmon	  owes	  us	  is	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  the	  left	  (vertical)	  chain	  of	  worlds	  is	  an	  a-­‐chain	  rather	  than	  a	  b-­‐chain.	  For	  all	   the	  argument	  requires,	  the	  differences	  between	  two	  such	  chains	   are	   only	   haecceitistic	   and,	   given	   this,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   imagine	  what	   a	   satisfactory	  answer	  could	  consist	  of.	  Rather,	  we	  are	  facing	  the	  original	  paradox	  on	  a	  bigger	  scale:	  this	  time,	   at	   the	   level	   of	   haecceitistically	   different	   chains	   of	   worlds.	   At	   such	   level,	  furthermore,	   Salmon	   has	   lost	   the	   possibility	   of	   appealing	   to	   (further)	   relational	  properties:	  the	  chains	  do	  not	  relationally	  differ.	  	  	   Someone	  might	  object	  that	  this	  second	  reaction	  is	  unfair	  on	  the	  following	  grounds.	  In	  the	  quotation	  above	  by	  means	  of	  which	  Salmon	  motivates	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	   intuition	  and	  his	  principle	  (V’’),	  he	  speaks	  of	  possible	  worlds,	  as	  opposed	  to	  of	  brute	  worlds	  as	   I	  have	   been	   doing.	   To	   recall,	   he	   asks	   us	   there	   to	   consider	   “two	   tables	   in	   two	   different	  possible	   worlds	   [that]	   are	   constructed	   from	   the	   very	   same	   stuff”.	   As	   a	   result—the	  complaint	  would	   go—he	  does	  not	  need	   to	  provide	   the	   answers	   I	   am	  demanding	  here,	  simply	  because	   there	  are	  no	   two	   such	   tables	   in	  possible	  worlds.	   In	  response:	   this	   is	  no	  defence	  on	  behalf	  of	  Salmon.	  His	  motivation	  of	  (V’’)	  is	  prior	  to	  both	  the	  formulation	  and	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  paradox,	  and	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  neutral	  on	  issues	  about	  the	  logical	  properties	   of	   the	   accessibility	   relation.	   If	   we	   read	   ‘possible	   worlds’	   in	   the	   above	  quotation,	   and	   other	   analogously	   motivating	   paragraphs	   of	   (Salmon	   1982),	   in	   this	  neutral	  way—i.e.,	  meaning	  brute	  worlds—Salmon’s	   solution	   is	   committed	   to	   the	   claim	  that	  two	  such	  tables	  can	  “fail	  to	  be	  the	  very	  same	  table”.	  Him	  being	  an	  anti-­‐haecceitist,	  one	   can	   legitimately	   ask	   him	  what	  makes	   them	  different	   tables.	   After	   having	   endorsed	  non-­‐transitivity,	   he	   should	   have	   gone	   back	   to	   those	   (motivating)	   questions	   and	  answered	   them.	   What	   turns	   this	   complaint	   into	   an	   objection	   is	   that,	   as	   seen,	   no	  satisfactory	  answer	  is	  forthcoming.	  	   	  To	  recap:	  Salmon’s	  solution	  to	  the	  paradox	  saves	  the	  letter	  of	  (V’’)	  but	  not	  its	  spirit.	  The	   considerations	   above	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   articulation	   of	   Lewis’	   explicit,	   though	  admittedly	   too	   brief,	   remark	   that	   Salmon’s	   non-­‐transitivity	   strategy	   “gives	   away	   the	  point	  of	  anti-­‐haecceitism	   in	  order	   to	  defend	   the	  words	   ‘Adam	  could	  not	  have	  occupied	  the	  Noah	  role’”	  (Lewis	  1986,	  p.	  247).	  	  
	  
Salmon’s	  denial	  of	  (5)	  and	  reliance	  on	  (3).	  So	  far,	  we	  have	  seen	  that,	  after	  endorsing	  (1),	   Salmon	   chooses	   to	   deny	   (2)	   and	   does	   not	  manage	   to	   accommodate	   (4).	  We	   shall	  finish	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  his	  view	  by	  seeing,	   first,	   that	  he	   is	  also	  committed	  to	  denying	  (5)	  and,	  second,	  that	  he	  implicitly	  relies	  on	  (3).	  Let	  us	  re-­‐state	  those	  two	  theses:	  	  (3)	   There	  are	  no	  coincident	  artefacts	  of	  the	  same	  kind,	  fully	  sharing	  their	  spatio-­‐temporal	  region	  	  (5)	   If	  P	  is	  the	  individual	  essence	  of	  an	  artefact,	  then	  all	  properties	  analogous	  to	  P	  are	  individual	  essences	  of	  artefacts	  too	  I	   shall	   start	  with	   the	   denial	   of	   (5).	   In	   Salmon’s	   scenario,	   b	  originates,	   in	  w2,	   from	  m3.	  Given	   Salmon’s	  assumption,	   the	   flexible	   property	  S3—being	  originally	   constructed	   from	  
any	  of	  m1,	  m2,	  m3,	  m4	  or	  m5	  plus	  C—is	   an	   individual	   essence	   of	  b	   in	  w2.	   But	   given	   that	  Salmon	   assumes	   the	   contingency	   of	   essences,	   this	   leaves	   open	   which	   property	  individuates	  b	   in	  the	  actual	  world	  w1.15	  Open,	  but	  only	  to	  some	  extent.	  For	  it	  must	  be	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  b	  exists	  in	  w1,	  we	  can	  legitimately	  ask	  which	  property	  individuates	  b	  in	  w1.	   	  For,	   in	  w2,	  b	  comes	  from	  m3.	  w2	   is	  accessed	  by	  w1,	  which	  means	  that	  w2	  realizes	  one	  of	  w1’s	  
Rethinking	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13 
property	  compatible	  with	  the	   fact	   that	  w2	  (where	  b	  originates	   from	  m3)	   is	  accessed	  by	  w1.	   The	   property	   must	   therefore	   involve	   m3	   as	   one	   of	   the	   possible	   origins.	   S2	   could,	  
prima	  facie,	  be	  such	  property:	  
S2	  	  =	  	  being	  originally	  constructed	  from	  m0,	  m1,	  m2,	  m3,	  or	  m4	  (plus	  C)	  However,	   in	   w1,	   where	   a	   originates	   from	   m0,	   S0	   individuates	   a	   (again	   by	   Salmon’s	  
assumption).	  S0	   and	  S2	   share	   several	  disjuncts,	   for	   instance	   the	  one	   involving	  m2.	  As	   a	  result,	  Salmon	  cannot	  let	  S2	  individuate	  b	  in	  w1	  because,	  if	  it	  did,	  m2	  would	  be,	  from	  w1,	  a	  possible	  origin	   for	  both	  a	   and	  b,	   and	   this	  would	   jeopardize	  even	   the	   letter	  of	   (V’’).	  For	  this	  would	  give	  us	  two	  possible	  worlds	  where	  a	  table	   is	  made	  from	  m2:	   in	  one	  of	  them,	  only	  a	  would	  exist	  and,	  in	  the	  other,	  only	  b	  would.	  As	  a	  result,	  being	  originated	  from	  m2	  would	  be,	  contra	  (V’’),	  sufficient	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  neither	  a	  nor	  b.	  	  	   By	   continuing	   to	   search	   for	   a	   property	   that	   avoids	   this	   problem,	   we	   arrive	   at	   the	  general	  claim	  that,	  whichever	  is	  the	  individual	  essence	  b	  has	  in	  w1,	  it	  must	  not	  involve,	  as	  one	  of	  its	  satisfaction	  conditions,	  any	  origin	  that	  is	  already	  in	  the	  range	  of	  possibilities	  for	   any	   other	   actual	   (or	   possible)	   entity	   from	   w1.	   For	   all	   we	   know	   about	   Salmon’s	  scenario,	  one	  such	  property	  could	  be	  S5:	  
S5	  	  =	  	  being	  originally	  constructed	  from	  m3,	  m4,	  m5,	  m6	  or	  m7	  (plus	  C)	  Generalizing,	  suppose	  we	  could	  name	  all	  pieces	  of	  matter	  analogous	  to	  m0	  and	  linearly	  order	   them	  by	   similarity.16	  Given	   that	   there	   is,	   in	  w1,	   a	   table,	  a,	  made	   from	  m0,	  whose	  possible	  origins	   are	   {m-­‐2,	  m-­‐1,	  m0,	  m1,	  m2},	   this—plus	  Salmon’s	   endorsement	  of	   (V’’)—constraints	  which	  properties	  are	  allowed,	   in	  Salmon’s	   framework,	   to	   individuate	  other	  tables	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  w1.	  Only	  the	  following	  partition	  is	  accepted	  from	  w1:	  …,	  m-­‐9,	  m-­‐8},	  {m-­‐7,	  m-­‐6,	  m-­‐5,	  m-­‐4,	  m-­‐3},	  {m-­‐2,	  m-­‐1,	  m0,	  m1,	  m2},	  {m3,	  m4,	  m5,	  m6…	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  S-­‐10	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  S-­‐5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  S0	  (for	  a)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  S5	  (for	  b)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  is	  the	  denial	  of	  (5).	  Property	  S2	  is	  analogous	  to	  S0	  but	  the	  former,	  unlike	  the	  latter,	  does	  not	  individuate,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  actual	  world	  (w1),	  any	  possibile.	  This	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  an	  extra	  cost	  of	  the	  account.17	  	  	  What	  about	  (3)?	  My	  argument	  above	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  “Salmon	  cannot	  let	  S2	  individuate	  
b”	   implicitly	   assumed	   that	   the	   denial	   of	   (3)	   is	   not	   available.	   For	   according	   to	   that	  argument,	  in	  order	  to	  account,	  from	  w1,	  for	  a’s	  possibility	  of	  originating	  from	  m2	  and	  for	  
b’s	   possibility	   of	   originating	   also	   from	   m2,	   we	   would	   need	   two	   possible	  worlds;	   one	  where	  only	  a	  exists	  and	  one	  where	  only	  b	  exists.	   I	  simply	  ignored	  there	  the	  theoretical	  possibility	  of	  letting	  one	  single	  world	  account	  for	  both	  possibilities,	  and	  claiming	  a	  and	  b	  be,	  in	  that	  single	  world,	  fully	  coincident	  entities.	  So	  Salmon	  is	  committed	  to	  denying	  (5)	  to	   the	   extent	   he	   relies	   on	   (3).	   And	   he	   does	   rely	   on	   (3).	   The	   paradoxical	   character	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  possibilities	  in	  relation	  to	  b.	  So,	  w1	  encodes	  what	  possibilities	  there	  are	  for	  b	  from	  w1.	  Which	  part	  of	  w1	  is	  responsible	  for	  this?	  The	  most	  natural	  answer	  is:	  ‘the	  essence	  that	  b	  has	  in	  w1,	  whether	  b	  is	  actual	  there,	  or	  merely	  a	  possibile’.	  16	  This	  is,	  once	  more,	  harmless	  simplification.	  17	  Thesis	  (5)	  hasn’t	  been	  much	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  and,	  yet,	  it	  is	  implicitly	  endorsed	  more	  often	  than	  is	  noticed.	  Peacocke	  (2002),	  for	  instance,	  endorses	  it	  to	  extend	  individuation	  principles	  of	  actual	  individuals	  to	  mere	  possibilia.	  More	  generally,	  something	  very	  close	  to	  (5)	  helps	  making	  a	  case	  for	  the	  possible	  existence	  of	  non-­‐actual	  individuals.	  	  
	   	   Sonia	  Roca-­‐Royes	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figure	  1	  consists	  precisely	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  two	  worlds—w3	  and	  w4—that	  instantiate	  a	  haecceitistic	  switch.	  At	  no	  point	  did	  Salmon	  consider	  blocking	  the	  paradox	  by	  endorsing	  fully	  (spatio-­‐temporally)	  coincident	  entities.	  This	  will	  be	  Williamson’s	  solution.	  	   To	   wrap	   up	   the	   whole	   of	   §2:	   Salmon’s	   solution	   only	  manages	   to	   accommodate,	   at	  best,	   two	   of	   the	   five	   original	   theses:	   (1)	   and	   (3).	   Because	   each	   of	   (1)-­‐(5)	   is	   better	  supported—theoretically	   or	   intuitively—than	   its	   salient	   rival,	   this	   is	   an	   expensive	  solution	   to	   the	  paradox.	  We	  shall	  next	  move	  on	   to	  scrutinize	  Williamson’s	  solution.	  As	  anticipated	  in	  §1,	  it	  promises	  to	  be	  cheaper	  in	  that	  it	  denies	  only	  (3).18	  	  	  
3.	  Scrutinizing	  Williamson’s	  view.	  	  In	  his	  Identity	  and	  Discrimination	  (1990),	  Williamson	  constructs,	  also	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  (1),	  a	  different	  paradox	  which	  we	  can	  call	   ‘the	  (Many)	  Two	  Earrings	  Paradox’.	  He	  solves	   it,	  ultimately,	   by	   denying	   (3).	   I	   shall	   scrutinize	  Williamson’s	   view,	   not	   by	   presenting	   and	  dealing	   with	   his	   paradox,	   but	   by	   applying	   his	   solution	   to	   Salmon’s	   paradox.19	  The	  emphasis	   will	   be	   on	   how	  Williamson’s	   approach	   compares	   to	   Salmon’s.	  We	   shall	   see	  how,	   once	   (1)	   is	   endorsed,	   denying	   (3)	   allows	  us	   to	   accommodate	   the	   rest	   of	   our	   five	  theses:	  (4),	  (2)	  and	  (5).	  	  	   One	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  denying	  (3)	  is	  the	  merging	  of	  w3	  and	  w4	  while	  not	  identifying	  a	  and	  b:	  a	  and	  b	  become	  distinct	  entities	  which	  fully	  share	  the	  spatio-­‐temporal	  region	  they	  occupy.	  Salmon’s	  four-­‐world	  scenario	  turns	  thus	  into	  a	  three-­‐world	  one:	  	   w1:	   a/m0/C	   ⇒	   w2:	  	  	  	  b/m3/C	   	   ¬(m0≈m3)	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  w3/w4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a+b/m2/C	   	   	  	  	  	  	   (m0≈m2)	  	  	  	  and	  	  	  	  (m2≈m3)	  
figure	  4	  Tables	  a	  and	  b	  are	   distinct	   because,	  while	   they	  might	   coincide	   in	   some	  worlds	  where	  they	  share	  all	  their	  categorical	  properties,	  they	  do	  not	  always	  coincide	  (like	  in	  w1	  or	  w2).	  And	  they	  do	  not	  always	  coincide	  because	  they	  differ	  in	  modal/essential	  properties.	  We	  shall	  take	  it	  here	  that,	  in	  the	  current	  Williamsonian	  account,	  S0	  individuates	  a	  and	  that	  S3	  individuates	  b.	  (This	  explains	  why	  a	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  w2	  and	  b	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  w1:	  m3	  is	  not	  a	  piece	  of	  matter	  a	  could	  come	   from	  and	  m0	   is	  not	  a	  piece	  of	  matter	  b	   could	  come	  from.)	  Let	  us	  now	  see	  how	  the	  other	  theses	  can	  be	  accommodated.	  	  	   The	  case	  of	  (5):	  We	  saw	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  §2	  that,	   in	  a	  framework	  that	  endorses	  (1),	  denying	   (3)	   renders	  a	  way	  of	   accommodating	   (5).	  Given	   that	  our	  game	  here	   is	   to	  accommodate	  as	  many	  theses	  as	  possible,	  we	  accommodate	  it.	  Consequently,	  for	  any	   i,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  We	  have	  now	  stock	  to	  make	  explicit	  the	  mutual	  inconsistency	  of	  (1)-­‐(5):	  If	  (5)	  is	  true,	  and	  if	  the	   individual	   essences	   are	   flexible	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   truth	   of	   (1),	   there	   are	   pairs	   of	  individual	  essences,	  e.g.,	  Sn	  and	  Sn+2,	  that	  overlap	  in	  satisfaction	  conditions,	  e.g.,	  Sn+1.	  If	  (4)	  is	  also	  true,	  these	  satisfaction	  conditions	  are	  sufficient	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  more	  than	  one	  entity	  of	  the	  same	  type;	  e.g.,	  a	  and	  b.	  This	  implies	  the	  negation	  of	  (3).	  19	  I	  will	  radicalize	  Williamson’s	  solution.	  Williamson	  (1990)	  doesn’t	  deny	  (3)	  for	  (his)	  tables.	  He	  denies	  it	  for	  ontologically	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  entities,	  which	  we	  might	  call	  ‘tables*’,	  determinately	  individuated	   by	   specific	   ranges	   of	   origins.	   For	   reasons	   I	   cannot	   extend	   on	   here,	   Williamson’s	  
tables	   (determinately)	   satisfy	   that	   ‘they	   are	   individuated	   by	   ranges	   of	   origin’,	   but	   (for	   reasons	  orthogonal	  to	  vagueness)	  there	  is	  no	  range	  of	  origins	  such	  that,	  determinately,	  individuates	  this	  (a	   particular)	   table.	   That	   is	   so	   (vagueness	   aside),	   however,	   for	   Salmon’s	   tables.	   Therefore,	   this	  “radicalization”	  is	  necessary	  because	  what	  would	  be	  Williamson’s	  tables*	  are	  Salmon’s	  tables.	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the	   (flexible)	   property	   Si	   will	   be,	   in	   this	   framework,	   an	   individual	   essence.	   Whereas	  Salmon	  could	  admit	  (from	  the	  actual	  world	  w1)	  only	  one	  partition,	  according	  to	  which	  only	  S-­‐10,	  S-­‐5,	  S0,	  S5,	  …	  are	  individual	  essences:	  …,	  m-­‐9,	  m-­‐8},	  {m-­‐7,	  m-­‐6,	  m-­‐5,	  m-­‐4,	  m-­‐3},	  {m-­‐2,	  m-­‐1,	  m0,	  m1,	  m2},	  {m3,	  m4,	  m5,	  m6…	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  S-­‐10	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  S-­‐5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  S0	  (for	  a)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  S5	  (for	  b)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Williamson	   allows	   for	   any	   of	   them;	   where	   (graphically)	   new	   partitions	   result	   from	  transposing	  the	  parenthesis	  above,	  one,	  two,	  three	  or	  four	  places	  to	  the	  right	  or	  to	  the	  left.	   These	   partitions	   are	   called,	   in	  Williamson’s	   technical	   approach,	   ‘M-­‐relations’.	  We	  don’t	  need	  to	  get	  into	  technicalities	  here,	  but	  it	  is	  instructive	  to	  see	  Williamson’s	  explicit	  disagreement	   with	   Salmon:	   “since	   any	   two	   of	   these	   are	   isomorphic,	   there	   is	   no	  reasonable	  way	  of	   choosing	  between	   them”	   (Williamson	  1990,	  132).	  According	   to	   the	  Williamsonian	   treatment	   we	   are	   now	   exploring,	   therefore,	   any	   set	   of	   five	   correlative	  origins	  (plus	  the	  C-­‐constraints)	  individuates	  a	  possible	  table.	  Unlike	  what	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Salmon,	  therefore,	  S2,	   from	  the	  actual	  world	  w1,	  does	  individuate	  some	  possible	  entity;	  an	  entity	  that	  Salmon	  had	  to	  abort	  from	  his	  ontology.	  	  
	   The	   case	   of	   (2).	   Given	   the	   three-­‐world	   scenario,	   we	   don’t	   have	   two	   worlds	  instantiating	   a	  haecceitistic	   switch	   and,	   as	   a	   result,	  we	   are	  under	  no	  pressure	   to	  deny	  (2).	  So	  we	  accommodate	  it	  too.	  Importantly,	  accommodating	  (2)	  requires	  the	  negation	  of	  
Salmon’s	  Assumption	  for,	  as	  seen	  in	  §2,	  that	  assumption	  enables	  a	  valid	  argument	  against	  (2).	   Denying	   this	   assumption	   allows	   us	   to	   keep,	   again	   contra	   Salmon,	   the	  necessity	   of	  individual	   essences—more	   rigorously:	   the	   necessity	   of	   which	   property	   Si	   is	   an	  individual	   essence	   of	   which	   entity—thereby	   avoiding	   any	   (Lewisian-­‐style)	   charge	   of	  anti-­‐essentialism.	  
	   The	  case	  of	   (4).	   By	   keeping	   the	   necessity	   of	   essences,	  we	   keep	   too	   the	   necessity	   of	  sufficiency	  properties,	  with	  which	   the	   current	   account	   can	  be	   said	   to	   respect	  both	   (4)	  the	  spirit	  of	   (V’’).	  For	   the	  account	  has	  no	  difficulty	   in	  accommodating	  conditionals	   like	  the	   following	   (whose	   antecedents	   are	   true	   in	   the	   account):	   If	   the	   (inflexible)	  property	  S2—originating	  from	  m2	  plus	  C—is	  a	  sufficient	  condition	   for	   the	  existence	  of	  a,	   then,	  at	  absolutely	  any	  (brute)	  world	  in	  which	  something	  satisfies	  S2,	  a	  exists	  there	  and	  satisfies	  that	  property.	  Surely,	  a	  will	  not	  be	  the	  only	  entity	  satisfying	   it:	  satisfaction	  of	  S2	   is	  also	  (absolutely)	  sufficient	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  entities,	   like	  b,	  with	  which	  a	  shares	  m2	  as	   a	   possible	   material	   origin.	   Therefore,	   both	   a	   and	   b	   exist	   in	   any	   world	   in	   which	  something	   is	  made	  from	  m2	  (+C),	  since	  that	   is	  absolutely	  sufficient	   for	   the	  existence	  of	  each.	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	  many	  beings	  supervene	  on	  the	  same	  qualitative-­‐plus-­‐matter	  facts,	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  satisfied	  in	  that,	  for	  any	  two	  (brute)	  worlds	   qualitatively-­‐and-­‐matter	   identical,	   the	   same	  many	  beings	   supervene	   in	   each	   of	  them.	   That	   is,	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   in	   numerical	   identities	   without	   a	   subvenient	  difference.	   To	   this	   extent,	   therefore,	   the	   spirit	   of	   (V’’)	   is	   accommodated.	   This	   time,	  however,	   it	   is	   its	   letter	   that	   is	   defective	  because,	   given	   the	   current	   account’s	  denial	   of	  (3),	  the	  uniqueness	  condition	  in	  the	  antecedent	  of	  (V’’)	  will	  never	  be	  satisfied.20	  On	  the	  current	   account,	   it	   is	   not	   origins	   but	   ranges	   of	   origins	   that	   (absolutely)	   individuate	  entities.	   Consequently,	   an	   unproblematic	   and	   accordingly	   revised	   cross-­‐world	  
identification	  principle	  could	  read	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  This	  assumes	  that	  (3)	  is	  necessarily	  false.	  This	  is	  the	  intended	  view	  under	  exploration.	  	  
	   	   Sonia	  Roca-­‐Royes	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(V*)	   If	   it	   is	  possible	   for	   table	  x	   to	  be	   the	  only	   table	  made	  (in	  C-­‐conditions)	   from	  a	  hunk	  of	  matter	  which	  overlaps	  with	  m0	  to	  a	  high	  degree	  and	  such	  that	  m0	  is	  at	  the	   centre	  of	   x’s	   possible	  origins,	   then,	   necessarily,	   any	  possible	   table	   that	   is	  the	  only	  table	  made	  (in	  C-­‐conditions)	  from	  a	  hunk	  of	  matter	  that	  overlaps	  with	  
m0	   to	  a	  high	  degree	  and	  such	  that	  m0	   is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	   its	  possible	  origins	   is	  table	  a	  and	  no	  other.	  	  To	  offer	  a	  graphic	   illustration	  of	   the	  current	  view’s	  ontology,	   let	  me	  name	  some	  of	   the	  
possibilia	  that	  Salmon’s	  ontology	  aborted	  but	  the	  Williamsonian	  one	  does	  not:	  ‘c’	  names	  the	  possibile	  individuated	  by	  S1;	  ‘d’,	  the	  one	  individuated	  by	  S2;	  ‘e’,	  the	  one	  individuated	  by	  S4;	  and	  ‘f’	  the	  one	  individuated	  by	  S5.	  The	  Williamsonian	  picture	  looks	  like	  this:	  	   w1:	   	   …a+c+d/m0/C	  
⇓	   	  w6:	   	   	  	  …a+b+c+d/m1/C	  
⇓	   	   	  w3:	   	   a+b+c+d+e/m2/C	  
⇓	   	  w2:	   	   …b+c+d+e+f/m3/C	  …	   	   …	  
figure	  5	  To	  explain	  it:	  I	  am	  ordering	  the	  worlds	  vertically	  by	  similarity	  of	  the	  pieces	  of	  matter.	  In	  every	  world,	  we	  keep	  a’s	  essence	  the	  same	  (S0),	  and	  this	  is	  why	  a	  has	  disappeared	  in	  w2,	  and	  also	  why	  Salmon’s	  w5—where	  a	  originated	  from	  m3—does	  not	  exist	  in	  this	  picture.	  Also	  b’s	  essence	  is	  the	  same	  in	  every	  world	  (S3),	  and	  this	  is	  why	  it	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  w1.	  For	  analogous	  reasons,	  e	  (individuated	  by	  S4),	  doesn’t	  exist	  in	  w1;	  etc.	  	   This	  account	  is	  committed	  to	  more	  possible	  individuals	  than	  Salmon’s.	  It	  would	  be	  too	  hasty,	  however,	   to	  conclude	   from	  here	   that	  Salmon’s	  account	   is	  ontologically	  superior.	  For	  by	  keeping	   transitivity,	  we	  have	  here	   that	  w1⇒w2.	  This	   fact	   accounts,	  without	   the	  need	  of	  expanding	  the	  picture	  horizontally,	  for	  the	  intuitive	  possibility	  that,	  from	  w1,	  m3	  be	  made	   into	   some	   table.	   Therefore,	   whereas	   the	   current	   account	   does	  with	   a	  unique	  
chain	  of	  worlds	  with	  multiply	  inhabited	  tables	  (with	  transitivity),	  Salmon’s—which	  had	  to	  grow	  horizontally—needs	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  chains	  of	  worlds	  with	  uniquely	  inhabited	  tables	  (without	   transitivity).21	  Only	   in	   Salmon’s	   ontology	   we	   would	   find	   uncountably	   many	  pairs	   of	  worlds	   instantiating	   haecceitistic	   switches.	   It	   is	   therefore	  difficult	   to	   compare	  the	  accounts’	  ontological	  costs.	  	   To	   conclude	   so	   far:	   of	   the	   two	   solutions	   considered,	   the	   Williamsonian	   one	   is	  preferable.	  However,	   it	   is	  committed	  to	   fully	  coincident	  entities	  of	  the	  same	  kind—it	   is	  committed	   to	   ¬(3)—and	   this	   is	   a	   considerable	   price.	   The	   literature	   contains	  independent	  reasons	  to	  believe	   in	  closely	  related	  phenomena:	   the	  statue	  and	  the	   lump	  would	  fully	  spatially	  coincide	  at	  some	  times;	  and	  the	  many	  cats	  quasi	  spatio(-­‐temporally)	  coincide	  with	   Tibbles.	   But	  whereas	   the	   statue	   and	   the	   lump	   are	   of	  different	   kind,	   and	  whereas	  the	  many	  cats	  do	  not	  fully	  spatially	  coincide,	  the	  Williamsonian	  coincidents	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  To	  be	  precise,	   instead	  of	   ‘inhabited	   tables’	   I	   should	   say	   ‘inhabited	   table-­‐shaped-­‐structured-­‐matter’.	  I	  chose	  the	  former	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  easy-­‐readability.	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of	  the	  same	  kind	  and	  fully	  coincident.	  For	  believing	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  coincidents,	  we	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  independent	  reasons.22	  This	  is	  a	  convenient	  dialectical	  point	  to	  explore	  the	  potential	  theoretical	  benefits	  of	  denying	  thesis	  (1)	  instead.	  	  
	  
4.	  	  An	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	  solution	  Flexible-­‐(EMOA)	   is	   intuitively	   more	   plausible	   than	   its	   inflexible	   rival.	   This	   has	   been	  granted	  since	  §1.	  The	  relevant	  question	  is	  whether	  denying	  the	  intuition	  which	  supports	  it	   can	   result	   in	   the	   best	   (reflectively)	   equilibrated	   view.	   I	   shall	   argue	   that	   it	   does.	  Because	  the	  Williamsonian	  solution	  has	  already	  been	  argued	  to	  be	  superior	  to	  Salmon’s,	  I	   only	   need	   to	   compare	   the	   current	   inflexible-­‐solution	   to	   Williamson’s.	   In	   terms	   of	  numbers,	   there	   is	  a	  tie:	  each	  accommodates	  exactly	   four	  of	  our	   five	  theses.	  The	  tie	  can	  arguably	   be	   broken,	   however,	   by	   showing	   how	   ontologically	   simpler	   the	   inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	  account	  is	  and	  by	  arguing	  that,	  while	  both	  can	  be	  said	  to	  accommodate	  (4),	  the	  current	  proposal	  better	  accommodates	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition	  behind	  it.	  	  	  
Breaking	  the	  tie	  The	  ontology	  of	  the	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	  proposal	  looks	  like	  this:	   	  	   	   …	   …	  	   w1:	   a/m0/C	  	   ⇓	   	   	  	   w3:	   b/m1/C	   	  	   ⇓	   	   	  	   w6:	   c/m2/C	   	  	   ⇓	   	   	  	   w2:	   d/m3/C	   	  	   …	   …	  
figure	  6	  To	  explain	   this	   figure:	   Individual	   essences	   are	  now	  given	  by	   inflexible	  properties,	   Si—
originating	  from	  mi	  plus	  C—and	  each	  of	  them	  can	  be	  said	  to	  individuate	  a	  possibile.	  So	  (5)	  is	  accommodated.	  We’re	  under	  no	  pressure	  to	  deny	  (3)	  or	  (2),	  so	  we	  accommodate	  them	  too.	   Because	  we	   keep	   transitivity,	   the	   picture	   (like	  Williamson’s	   and	   unlike	   Salmon’s)	  doesn’t	  need	   to	  grow	  horizontally.	   It	   is	   in	   the	  way	   the	  account	  accommodates	   (4)	   that	  makes	  a	  difference,	  as	  the	  following	  unfolds.	  	  	  	   The	   modal	   space	   of	   inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	   is	   the	   simplest	   one	   because	   it	   does	   with	   a	  
unique	  chain	  of	  worlds	  with	  uniquely	  inhabited	  tables.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  makes	  it	  the	  account	  that	  best	  manages	  to	  accommodate	  the	  anti-­‐haecceitist	  intuition	  underlying	  (4).	  In	  §2	  we	  saw	  how	  Salmon	  motivates	  it.	  He	  also	  characterizes	  it;	  as	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Fine	  (2000)	  has	  argued	  independently	  that	  two	   letters	  can	  spatially	  coincide	  at	  some	  times.	  Even	   if	   his	   example	   is	   persuasive,	   Fine’s	   letters	   are	   not	   yet	   a	   case	   of	   full	   spatio-­‐temporal	  coincidence,	  as	  Bruce’s	  letter	  comes	  into	  existence	  sooner	  than	  Bertha’s.	  Also,	  Fine’s	  two	  letters	  have	   different	   categorical	   features:	   their	   second	   words,	   for	   instance,	   are	   different.	   The	  Williamsonian	  denial	  of	  (3)	  is	  stronger	  than	  Fine’s	  denial	  of	  Locke’s	  thesis:	  It	  is	  committed	  to	  fully	  spatio-­‐temporally	   coincident	   entities	   that	   do	   not	   differ	   at	   all	   in	   categorical	   properties	   either.	  Thanks	  to	  Matti	  Eklund	  and	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  pressing	  me	  on	  this.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   Sonia	  Roca-­‐Royes	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“reductionist”	   intuition	   that	   objects	   are	   “nothing	   over	   and	   above”	   their	  matter	   and	  structure,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   a	   complete	   accounting	   of	   what	   matter	   there	   is	   in	   a	  genuinely	   possible	   world,	   with	   its	   causal	   interconnections	   and	   exact	   configuration	  through	   time,	   atom	   for	   atom,	   quark	   for	   quark,	   must	   completely	   and	   uniquely	  determine	  whatever	  physical	  facts	  there	  are	  about	  each	  of	  the	  physical	  objects	  such	  as	  tables	  and	  ships	  present	  in	  the	  world,	  including	  such	  facts	  as	  that	  a	  particular	  hunk	  of	  matter	  a’	  constitutes	  a	  particular	  ship	  a	  at	  time	  t.	  (Salmon	  1982,	  237)	  On	   the	  Williamsoninan	   view,	   it	   is	   always	  many	  beings	   that	   supervene	   on	   facts	   about	  matter	   and	   structure.	   This	   is	   important.	   For	   even	   if	   it’s	   always	   the	   same	  many	  beings	  that	  supervene	  on	  same	  facts,	  artefacts,	  on	  that	  view,	  must	  be	  something	  over	  and	  above	  structure	  and	  matter:	  for	  numerically	  distinct	  beings	  supervene	  on	  numerically	  identical	  such	   facts.	   Those	   distinctness	   facts	   are	   not	   grounded	   in	   the	   way	   the	   reductionist	  intuition	  above	  expects.	  Only	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	  can	  strictly	  accommodate	  such	  intuition	  and	  thus	  aspire	  to	  maximal	  conservativeness.	  	  	   This	  concludes	  my	  brief	  statement	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  preferring	  the	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	  account.	   That	   the	   statement	   can	   be	   brief	   is	   only	   due	   to	   it	   arriving	   after	   an	   in-­‐depth	  exploration	   of	   the	  most	   salient	   rivals.	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   those	   explorations,	   I	   intend	   the	  
reasons	  themselves	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  strong,	  abductive	  reasons.	  	  
	  
A	  bad	  reason	  against	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	  I	   shall	   conclude	   by	   undermining	   a	   reason	   against	   the	   current	   view:	   namely,	   that	   it	  requires	  an	  utterly	  false	  correspondingly-­‐inflexible	  view	  in	  the	  temporal	  case.	  	  	   Let	   us	   first	   see	   on	   what	   grounds	   one	   could	   think	   so.	   The	   persistence	   conditions	  through	  time	  for	  an	  artefact	  are	  also	  intuitively	  flexible:	  an	  artefact	  survives	  changes	  in	  material	  constitution	  through	  time.	  And	  flexible	  intuitions	  in	  the	  temporal	  case	  generate	  paradoxes	   too,	   like	   the	   Ship	   of	   Theseus	   Paradox.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   main	   generator	   of	  temporal	  and	  modal	  paradoxes	  is	  a	  flexible	  intuition	  in	  both	  cases	  might	  make	  one	  think	  that	  the	  solutions	  to	  both	  sorts	  of	  paradoxes	  should	  be	  uniform:	  either	  we	  violate	  both	  intuitions	  or	  we	  violate	  none.23	  If	  that	  is	  so,	  the	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	  approach	  would	  need	  to	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  an	  inflexible	  view	  in	  the	  temporal	  case,	  according	  to	  which,	  table	  
a’s	  loss	  of	  one	  molecule	  at	  a	  given	  time	  would	  result	  in	  a	  different	  table.	  This	  would	  be	  bad	  news	  because—as	  I	  am	  ready	  to	  grant—the	  flexible	  intuition	  in	  the	  temporal	  case	  is	  close	  to	  non-­‐negotiable.	  	  	   Against	  this	  concern,	  I	  shall	  argue	  (i)	  that	  we	  would	  need	  to	  be	  given	  reasons	  for	  the	  uniform-­‐solution	  desideratum,	  and	  (ii)	  that	  taking	  tables	  to	  be	  certain	  spatio-­‐temporally	  extended	  entities	  suffices	  to	  accommodate	  the	  flexible	  intuition	  in	  the	  temporal	  case	  and	  is	   compatible	   with	   the	   inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	   account	   that	   has	   been	   here	   abductively	  favoured.	  This	  would	  constitute	  further	  progress	  still	  in	  equilibrium.	  	  	  	   The	   case	   of	   (i).	   The	   persistence	   conditions	   through	   time	   for	   an	   artefact,	   x,	   are	   not	  
intuitively	   the	   same	   as	  what	  we	  might	   call	   ‘the	   persistence	   conditions	   across	  worlds’.	  They	   are	   not	   because	   our	   underlying	   intuitions	   are	   not	   the	   same,	   despite	   both	   being	  flexible.	  Flexible	  intuitions	  in	  the	  temporal	  case	  are	  more	  flexible	  than	  flexible	  intuitions	  in	  the	  modal	  case.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  reflecting	  on	  figure	  7,	  where	  capital	  letters	  stand	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Williamson	  (1990)	  is	  a	  salient	  representative	  here.	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for	   pieces	   of	  matter,	   and	  a	  and	  b	   are	  distinct	   artefacts	   that	  would	  be	   constituted	  by	   a	  number—six	  in	  the	  example—of	  those	  pieces	  of	  matter:	  	  
	   	   original	  matter	   subsequent	  (non-­‐original)	  matter	  through	  temporal	  change	  
w7	   b	   GHIJKL	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	  
w6	   b	   GHIJKF	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	  
w5	   b	   GHIJEF	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	  
w4	   a	   GHIDEF	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	  
w3	   a	   GHCDEF	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	  
w2	   a	   GBCDEF	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	   …	  
w1	   a	   ABCDEF	   GBCDEF	   GHCDEF	   GHIDEF	   GHIJEF	   GHIJKF	   GHIJKL	  
	   	   a	   a	   a	   a	   a	   a	   a	  
	   	   t1	   t2	   t3	   t4	   t5	   t6	   t7	  
figure	  7	  This	  table	  represents	  the	  intuitive	  fact	  that	  a	  sequence	  of	  (small)	  changes	  across	  possible	  worlds	  results	   in	  a	  different	  entity	  sooner	  than	  the	  same	  sequence	  of	  changes	  through	  time;	  that	  is,	  the	  intuitive	  range	  of	  tolerance	  is	  narrower	  in	  the	  modal	  case.	  To	  illustrate:	  we	  have	  lost	  a	  in	  w5	  because,	  according	  to	  the	  modal	  flexible	  intuition,	  a	  cannot	  originate	  from	  a	  hunk	  of	  matter	  that,	  like	  GHIJEF,	  is	  too	  different	  from	  a’s	  actual	  original	  matter:	  ABCDEF.	   And	   we	   have	   not	   lost	   a	   in	   t5	   because,	   according	   to	   the	   temporal	   flexible	  intuition,	  a	  can	  subsequently	  be	  constituted	  by	  GHIJEF	  in	  the	  actual	  world.	  	  	   The	  intuitions	  are	  therefore	  not	  the	  same.	  Why,	  then,	  should	  a	  uniform-­‐solution	  be	  a	  desideratum?	  At	  a	  minimum,	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  the	  intuitions	  are	  not	  the	  same	  calls	  for	  reasons	  if	  we	  are	  to	  have	  it	  as	  a	  desideratum.	  	  For,	  once	  shown	  to	  be	  different	  intuitions,	  why	  should	  these	  two	  intuitions	  be	  accommodated	  or	  violated	  together?	  In	  addition,	  the	  prospects	  of	  finding	  a	  persuasive	  reason	  for	  such	  desideratum	  should	  be	  low	  if,	  as	  I	  shall	  next	   motivate,	   the	   independently	   abductively	   favoured	   inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	   account	   is	  compatible	   with	   a	   view	   on	   what	   tables	   are	   that	   accommodates	   the	   (non-­‐negotiable)	  temporal	  intuition.	  	  	   The	   case	   of	   (ii).	   Provided—an	   assumption	   I	   shall	   not	   defend	   here—that	   reality	   is	  spatio-­‐temporally	  extended,	  spatio-­‐temporally	  extended	  portions	  of	  reality	  are	  possible	  referents	  of	  our	  singular	  concepts	  and	  singular	  terms.	  General	  concepts	  help	  us	  classify	  such	   portions.	   If	   one	   takes	   (certain)	   intuitions	   about	   artefacts	   as	   speaking	   of	   the	  
semantics	  of	  our	  terms—as	  many	  would—such	  intuitions	  are	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  data	  when	  articulating	   the	   meaning	   of	   our	   terms.	   For	   instance,	   to	   accommodate	   the	   temporal	  flexible	  intuition,	  one	  must	  take	  the	  application	  and	  the	  co-­‐application	  conditions	  for,	  for	  instance,	   ‘table’,	   to	   leave	   room	   for	   tables	   to	   survive	  changes	   in	  material	   constitution.24	  And	  it	  suffices	  that	  one	  takes	  them	  to	  do	  so.	  Similarly,	  if	  one	  wants	  to	  accommodate	  the	  intuition	  that	  no	  two	  tables	  can	  ever	  spatially	  coincide,	  one	  must	  take	  the	  semantics	  of	  ‘table’	  to	  rule	  that	  out.	  These	  two	  intuitions	  are	  mutually	  consistent	  and,	  together,	  they	  suggest	  that	  the	  application	  and	  co-­‐application	  conditions	  for	  ‘table’	  includes	  something	  along	  the	  following	  lines:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  I’m	  following	  Thomasson’s	  (2009)	  here.	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(AC)	   being	   a	   maximal	   sequence	   of	   temporally	   continuous	   maximal	   spatially	  extended	  and	  contiguous	  table-­‐shaped	  wholes.	  	  Taking	  the	  (AC)-­‐constraints	  on	  board,	  and	  assuming	  that	  (common	  sense)	  table	  a	  from	  
figure	  7	  came	  into	  existence	  at	  t1	  and	  ceased	  to	  exist	  at	  t7,	  only	  the	  first	  of	  the	  following	  eight	  sequences	  is	  a	  portion	  of	  reality	  that	  can	  be	  correctly	  described	  as	  a	  table;	  the	  table	  that	  we’ve	  been	  calling	  ‘a’.	  The	  rest	  are	  proper	  parts	  of	  that	  table	  that	  do	  not	  satisfy	  the	  (AC)-­‐conditions:	  	  	  
w1	  
P1	   ABCDEF•GBCDEF•GHCDEF•GHIDEF•GHIJEF•GHIJKF•GHIJKL	  P2	   ABCDEF•GBCDEF•GHCDEF•GHIDEF•GHIJEF•GHIJKF•GHIJKL	  P3	   ABCDEF•GBCDEF•GHCDEF•GHIDEF•GHIJEF•GHIJKF•GHIJKL	  P4	   ABCDEF•GBCDEF•GHCDEF•GHIDEF•GHIJEF•GHIJKF•GHIJKL	  P5	   ABCDEF•GBCDEF•GHCDEF•GHIDEF•GHIJEF•GHIJKF•GHIJKL	  P6	   ABCDEF•GBCDEF•GHCDEF•GHIDEF•GHIJEF•GHIJKF•GHIJKL	  P7	   ABCDEF•GBCDEF•GHCDEF•GHIDEF•GHIJEF•GHIJKF•GHIJKL	  P8	   ABCDEF•GBCDEF•GHCDEF•GHIDEF•GHIJEF•GHIJKF•GHIJKL	  
	   	   	  	  	   	  	  t1	   	  	  	  	  	  t2	   	  	  	  	  	  	  t3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  t4	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  t5	   	  	  	  t6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  t7	  
figure	  8	  Portion	  (P2),	  for	  instance,	  is	  not	  a	  maximal	  sequence,	  for	  «ABCDEF»	  exists	  but	  is	  not	  part	  of	  (P2).	  Nor	  is	  (P5),	  for	  analogous	  reasons.	  Also,	  if	  A	  is	  sufficiently	  small,	  «BCDEF»	  might	  still	   be	   table-­‐shaped	   but	   it	   is	   not	   a	  maximal	   spatially	   extended	   and	   contiguous	   table-­‐shaped	  whole;	  ABCDEF	  would	  be	  maximal	   in	  this	  sense.	  Under	  this	  assumption,	  (P8)	   is	  not	   a	   sequence	  of	  maximal	  spatially	   extended	   and	   contiguous	   table-­‐shaped	  wholes,	   so	  such	  portion	  of	  reality	  is	  also	  only	  a	  part	  of	  a	  table.	  	  	   Now,	  if	  tables	  are	  this	  sort	  of	  spatio-­‐temporally	  extended	  portions	  of	  reality,	  they	  can	  survive	  change	  through	  time,	  as	  a	  does	  in	  figure	  7.	  This	  view	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  modal	  views	  about	  tables:	  can	  two	  different	  (AC)-­‐sequences—i.e.,	  different	  portions	  of	  reality—in	   different	  worlds	   be	   the	   same	   table?	   How	   one	   answers	   this	   question	   (and	  related	   ones)	   will	   reflect	   what	   intuitive	   possibilities	   for	   tables	   one	   wants	   to	  accommodate.	  For	  instance,	  answering	  “Yes,	  provided	  one	  is	  a	  proper	  initial	  segment	  of	  the	  other”	  would	  basically	  only	  allow	   the	   tables’	  duration	   to	  be	   contingent;	   answering	  “Yes,	  provided	   the	   first	  element	   in	  each	  sequence	   is	   the	   same”	  would	   imply	   inflexible-­‐(EMOA)	   but	   allow	   for	   different	   material	   futures	   of	   the	   same	   table;	   answering	   “Yes,	  provided	  the	  first	  element	  in	  each	  sequence	  overlaps	  enough	  with	  the	  other”	  would	  be	  even	  more	  liberal	  in	  implying	  flexible-­‐(EMOA)”.	  Each	  of	  these	  answers	  would	  need	  to	  be	  scrutinized	   in	   a	   way	   similar	   to	   what	   has	   been	   done	   in	   this	   paper	   with	   the	   thesis	   of	  essentiality	   of	   origins,	   and	   it	   is	   to	   be	   expected	   that	   some	  will	   have	   higher	   costs	   than	  others.25	  	  	   For	  current	  purposes,	   it	  suffices	  to	  conclude	  by	  saying	  that,	   the	  more	  liberal	  we	  are	  with	  our	  answers,	  the	  more	  we	  are	  distancing	  ourselves	  from	  the	  reductionist	  intuition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Other	  relevant	  questions,	   for	   the	   temporal	  case,	   include	  whether	  different	  sequences	   in	   the	  
same	   world	   could	   be	   the	   same	   table	   (as	   it	   would	   intuitively	   happen	   with	   a	   dismantled	   and	  reassembled	  ship),	  or	  whether	  the	  same	  sequence	  in	  the	  same	  world	  at	  different	  intervals	  of	  time	  would	  be	  the	  same	  table.	  The	  (AC)	  application	  conditions	  leaves	  all	  these	  matters	  open,	  and	  is,	  as	  such,	  compatible	  with	  a	  number	  of	  solutions	  to	  the	  temporal	  paradoxes.	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that	   objects	   are	   “nothing	   over	   and	   above”	   their	   matter	   and	   structure.	   If,	   apart	   from	  ontological	   neatness—which	   contributed	   to	   favouring	   inflexible-­‐(EMOA)—the	  reductionist	  intuition	  is	  also	  something	  we	  want	  to	  try	  to	  accommodate	  at	  its	  best,	  then,	  the	  answer	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  question	  above	  is	  the	  stringent:	  “No,	  never”.	  Such	  answer	  implies	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA),	  and	  makes	  material	  constitution	  at	  each	  time—not	  just	  at	  the	  original	   time—essential	   to	   tables.	   I	   feel	   some	   sympathy	   for	   such	   reductionist	   view	   of	  artefacts.	  Importantly,	  however,	  despite	  being	  quite	  a	  rigid	  essentialist	  position,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  rigid	  as	  to	  disallow	  continuance	  through	  (temporal)	  change.	  Even	  more	  importantly,	  it	  is	  not	  necessitated	  by	  inflexible-­‐(EMOA);	  it’s	  only	  very	  congenial	  to	  it.26	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